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Abstract 
 
 
 This paper attempts to prove that the United States failed to fulfill 
its international legislative obligations – namely the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – in the conflicts 
that occurred in the disintegrating state of Yugoslavia during the early 
1990s. By doing this, the paper also attempts to discredit the idea 
promulgated by the first Bush administration that following the Gulf War 
and the end of the Cold War in 1991 there had emerged a “New World 
Order” which would combat the dark side of human nature and ensure that 
human rights and international law were observed internationally.  
The paper attempts to prove these conclusions, first, through an 
examination of the history of the rise of ethnic hatred in Serbia – then a 
republic of Yugoslavia – and how this hatred led to the breakup of 
Yugoslavia and the genocide of the non-Serb population, mainly Muslim, 
in the Yugoslavian republics of Croatia and Bosnia, mainly Bosnia. 
Second, the paper attempts to document the substantial amounts of public 
information about the genocide – available in the United States as the 
genocide was taking place – as well as public and private 
acknowledgments by the U.S. and other governments – made as the 
genocide occurred – that a genocide was in fact taking place in Bosnia. To 
accomplish this the paper uses accounts from books, and articles in 
magazines, journals, and newspapers written before, during, and after, the 
genocide took place.  
The thesis attempts to prove one overriding conclusion: Despite an 
abundant amount of information that genocide might take place, was 
taking place, and had taken place Bosnia, the U.S. and other governments 
did not act to prevent the genocide from occurring. This was especially 
startling as the deliberate inaction took place immediately following the 
end of the Cold War and the supposed creation of a New World Order, 
which President George H.W. Bush was then proclaiming as a global 
effort to support the “victory for the rule of law and for what is right”. 
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 6 
Introduction 
The first couple of years of the 1990s were a dynamic time for the 
United States and the world. Just prior, in 1989, the Berlin Wall had 
fallen, and the U.S.S.R, the U.S.’s competitor in the Cold War, had been 
self-destructing ever since. By the end of 1991 the Soviet Union would 
cease to exist. Moreover, during that same year, the United States, along 
with the help of many other nations and with the approval of the United 
Nations and a united Security Council, had expelled Saddam Hussein from 
Kuwait after his army had invaded that country the previous year. The 
breaking of the bi-polar world and the unity of international action 
surrounding the Gulf War was seen by some, including the first President 
Bush, as the start of a “New World Order”, one where the United States 
and its allies would be able to finally act forcefully in foreign policy, not 
only to protect vital interests, but also to protect cherished values (Power, 
2003, p. 260).  
 President George H.W. Bush had first proclaimed the idea of a 
New World Order on September 11, 1990, when he addressed the U.S. 
Congress about Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Iraq’s invasion was a 
“contravention of international law”, Bush claimed. This “mockery of 
human decency” offered the world a test, “a rare opportunity” for it to 
coalesce and create a “New World Order” that would be “freer from the 
threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the 
quest for peace” (Bush, 1990). In the months that followed, Bush would 
claim the world had passed this first test, as it came together – led by the 
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United States – and forcibly removed Saddam Hussein’s troops from 
Kuwait, winning a “victory for the rule of law and for what is right” 
(Bush, 1991).  
 Following the end of the Gulf War, President Bush reiterated his 
hope for a New World Order on March 6, 1991, again in a speech before 
the U.S. Congress where he claimed that the coalescence of international 
will and force seen in the Gulf War “would not end with the liberation of 
Kuwait”, but instead would “forge a future that should never again be held 
hostage to the darker side of human nature” (ibid). Bush proclaimed his 
hope that “the United Nations, free from Cold War stalemate”, could 
“fulfill the historic vision of its founders…protect the weak against the 
strong” and create a “world in which freedom and respect for human rights 
find a home among all nations” (ibid).   
 The end of the Cold War had brought many new problems that did 
create the need for international action in order to create a world for 
freedom and respect for human rights. The belief that democracy would 
sweep the world in the post-Cold War world was not so simply realized 
(Fukuyama, 1992). Instead, the end of the Cold War would bring about a 
proliferation of problems that the international community should have 
responded to effectively in order to comply with Bush’s vision of a New 
World Order. One of these problems was the eruption of violent conflicts 
based upon ethnicity and nationalism.  
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Indeed, the lid of at least superficial peace and stability that the 
Cold War had provided more or less disappeared, and the post-Cold War 
world featured well-armed factions that sought to seize power in countries 
that no longer had two superpowers propping them up (Barber, 1992; 
Rosenau and Durfee, 1999). Thus, the idea of a New World Order would 
soon receive another test following its success and supposed affirmation in 
the Gulf War. The test would come in the ethnic conflicts of a 
disintegrating Yugoslavia, then a communist country in southeastern 
Europe that shared a border with Italy, Greece and other Eastern European 
countries. The ethnic conflict in this country would quickly develop into 
genocide, the first to occur in the post-Cold War era. 
The United States had the legal authority, by international law, to 
intervene in Bosnia and halt the genocide. The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide clearly defines 
genocide as,  
 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group;  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part;  
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group (Blaustein et al, 1987, p. 100).  
 
In 1986, the United States had signed onto the Genocide 
Convention, which mandates signatories “to prevent and to punish” any 
attempt of genocide as defined above (ibid). Thus, “if the Gulf War posed 
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the first test for U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world, the 
Bosnian genocide offered a second” (Power, 2003, p. 247). 
This paper attempts to thoroughly demonstrate that the U.S. and 
other governments failed this second test of the New World Order. It 
attempts to prove this conclusion by demonstrating that the U.S. and other 
governments 1) had warning to expect that genocide may occur in 
Yugoslavia, 2) that there was enough information both publicly available 
and confidentially held by the U.S. and other governments as the Bosnian 
genocide took place to confirm that a genocide was in fact occurring, and 
3) that the U.S. and other governments deliberately developed misleading 
rationales to justify their policies of nonintervention during the Bosnian  
genocide. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Bosnian genocide, the U.S. 
and other governments continued to fail in their effort to create a New 
World Order as their policies both awarded Serb aggression and genocide 
while failing to do anything to punish it.  
The conclusions of this paper, while somewhat applicable to other 
genocides during the 20th century, are specific to the Bosnian genocide 
and the context in which it took place, a time when the President of the 
United States was asserting the idea of a New World Order that he 
claimed was a major change in the foreign policies of the U.S. and other 
governments. The paper’s overall goal is not to generally analyze U.S. 
foreign policy and when the U.S. and other governments decide to 
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intervene and when they do not, although implications of the failure of the 
New World Order will be drawn out in the conclusion.  
However, the overall goal of the paper it to simply attempt to 
demonstrate that during the Bosnian genocide, the U.S. and other 
government failed to live up to the ideas of the New World Order.  
 
I. Bosnian Genocide History 
 
Introduction to the Bosnian Genocide 
Different from the Rwandan, Cambodian, Armenian, and other 
genocides of the 20th century, the Bosnian genocide was carried out under 
the close scrutiny of the international community. Bosnia benefited simply 
from to its location in Europe, a focal point of U.S. foreign policy, 
especially following World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. 
Prior to its breakup, Yugoslavia had been a communist state that garnered 
specific strategic interest following its break with Soviet policy in 1948 
and its subsequent policy of nonalignment. 
However, by the time conflicts in the republics of Yugoslavia 
began, the first in Slovenia when that republic declared its independence 
June 25, 1991, Yugoslavia’s importance in U.S. political considerations 
had declined considerably. This was due to, first, the fact that the threat of 
the Soviet Union had been declining since 1985 and had almost 
completely vanished by 1991. This meant that Yugoslavia’s status as a 
nonaligned communist country was of declining importance to the United 
States (Bert, 1997, p. 5). Additionally, as the Soviet Union broke apart, the 
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United States was focusing less and less on foreign affairs and foreign 
policy in general, as years of spending and focus on issues of foreign 
policy had exhausted the American public’s desire to tend to external 
problems. Indeed, in 1991, “the American people felt themselves entitled 
to some relief from foreign crises and a chance to concentrate on domestic 
issues” (ibid, p. 82). Hence, an internal power struggle in a country of 
declining geopolitical importance did not figure prominently, for the most 
part, in the purview of the American public, intellectuals, or politicians.  
Still, the fact that Yugoslavia was in Europe, literally on the 
doorstep of Western Europe – sharing a border with two countries of what 
was then the European Community (Italy and Greece) – meant that it 
could not easily be ignored. However, the many warning signs of possible 
ethnic conflict and genocide that were present prior to the commencement 
of conflict in 1991 may not have received the level attention they would 
have earlier when Yugoslavia was a focus of international affairs. 
However, once conflict did break out and genocide did begin to occur in 
the fracturing republics of Yugoslavia – first in Croatia, then in Bosnia – 
they received a substantial amount of attention from the West, especially 
in comparison to the lack of attention paid to Rwanda and other sites of 
genocide in the past. Indeed, “no other atrocity campaign in the twentieth 
century was better monitored and understood by the U.S. government…in 
the Bosnian war, the truth had never been in short supply (Power, 2003, p. 
264, 327). 
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The creation of hate 
There were plenty of warning signs that potentially bloody ethnic 
conflict could break out in Yugoslavia as the country began to break apart. 
For many scholars (Cushman & Mestrovic, 1996; Mestrovic, 1997; Cigar, 
1995) the first real warning sign came in 1986, when the Serbian 
Academy of Arts and Sciences published its “Serbian Memorandum,” 
which outlined the importance of Serbian solidarity and the need for this 
solidarity to be placed within a Serbian state. The Memorandum 
proclaimed the need to join all Serbs, including Serbian minorities from 
other republics of Yugoslavia, into one state due to a perceived 
victimization of Serbs in the past. The memorandum stated that the Serbs 
were the “perpetual losers” of diplomatic negotiations and were thus 
always denied proper democratic representation (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 102). 
Since Serbs were forced to be scattered within the republics of other 
nationalities – in this case, the republics of Yugoslavia, of which Serbia 
was part – they were discriminated against and denied their democratic 
rights, or so the reasoning went. The Memorandum called for the creation 
of a Greater Serbia, a state with “full national integrity for the Serbian 
people, regardless of which republic or province” they inhabited (Cigar, 
1995, p. 23).  
It was with this argument that Slobodan Milosevic rose from 
obscurity in the Yugoslavian Communist Party to national prominence. On 
April 1987, he publicly declared at a Serbian protest over an alleged 
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incident of police brutality in the autonomous Yugoslavian province of 
Kosovo that he would make it his goal to protect the Serbian people 
(Simons and Smale, 2006). This was significant as prior to that moment 
nationalist declarations were not supposed to be used by officials of the 
communist party. The protest, while seemingly a spontaneous show of 
Milosevic’s love for the Serbian people, was, in fact, staged by Milosevic 
to ensure that the protestors would come, that the media would be in the 
right place to document his statements, and that the protesters would 
embrace Milosevic following his statement. They did so emphatically 
(ibid). This was the start of a carefully orchestrated propaganda campaign 
by Milosevic to consolidate power in Yugoslavia by mobilizing people 
around issues of ethnicity. This propaganda campaign would ultimately 
lead to the execution, mass deportation, and rape of non-Serbs who were 
living on land deemed to be part of a Greater Serbia.  
Following his public declaration of Serbian solidarity, Milosevic 
became the political face of Serbian nationalism, a strong position to be in 
as Serbian nationalism had been “simmering” among the Serbian 
intellectuals and the clerics of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade, 
the capital of what was then the Yugoslavian republic of Serbia (Cigar, 
1995). The position of many intellectuals was clear with the publication of 
the Serbian Memorandum and the writings of other professors at the 
University of Belgrade. In the other writings, academics would paint Islam 
(the Bosnian republic had a plurality of Muslims within it) as “retrograde” 
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to modern civilization, as an alien religion and culture from which the 
Serbian people should be protected through the creation of a Greater 
Serbia (Cigar, 1995, p. 31). At the same time, a best-selling author in 
Serbia wrote about a “vampire-like resurgence” of a government by 
Islamic law, and presented maps of a Greater Serbia he hoped would be 
created. These maps featured large parts of Bosnia annexed to Serbia 
(ibid). The Serbian Orthodox Church, meanwhile, also warned publicly of 
Islamic “primitivism” and that Serbs were under a direct threat from 
“jihad” due to the Muslims presence within Yugoslavia (ibid). Indeed, 
“…influential figures in Serbia had begun to shape a stereotypical image 
of Muslims as alien, inferior, and a threat to all that the Serbs hold 
dear…This discourse spanned much of the Serbian national elite, 
including leading intellectuals, political figures, and clergymen, and its 
impact was to extend to all strata of society” (ibid, p. 25).  
Milosevic intensified this discourse for his own political ends, 
becoming president in 1988 of Serbia, where he was able to use the state 
propaganda machine to greatly increase the fostering of Serbian 
nationalism and hatred for other ethnicities (ibid, p. 34). “Significantly, 
convincing documentation shows that the entire process, from the original 
appearance of Serbian protests in Kosovo through the subsequent series of 
political machinations, was orchestrated and managed by Milosevic and 
his faction” (ibid, p. 33).  
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Indeed, as David Rieff wrote while examining this relatively brief 
history of ethnic hatred in Yugoslavia, (1995, p. 71) “…the conflict and 
ethnic divisions were not inevitable….” Prior to Milosevic’s rise to power 
there was a prominent Southern Slav culture in Yugoslavia that bound 
Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims together. The breakup of that culture, 
like the breakup of Yugoslavia, did not just happen by coincidence (ibid). 
It took a lot of work on the part of Milosevic and other nationalists. “Serb 
nationalism and suspicion, both fueled by Milosevic’s movement, ensured 
that Serbs, both in Serbia and elsewhere, would find it impossible to 
accept a governing framework which cast them as a protected minority” 
(Bert, 1997, p. 42). Indeed, Milosevic’s actions and motives were not a 
mystery to the United States. Warren Zimmerman, then ambassador to 
Yugoslavia was quoted in 1989 saying: “What does Slobodan Milosevic 
want? He wants to destroy Yugoslavia and pick up the pieces in a ‘Greater 
Serbia.’ That is the only theory that explains all the facts. For the last few 
years, most of his actions were against the unity of Yugoslavia” 
(Mestrovic, 1997, p. 92). 
By 1989, Milosevic had rewritten the Yugoslavian constitution, 
giving Serbia dominance in the Yugoslavian government while seizing 
complete control of the formerly autonomous Yugoslavian province of 
Kosovo (Cushman & Mestrovic, p. 42). With this dominance Milosevic 
initiated policies in all of Yugoslavia that were pro-Serb, angering the 
other republics where Serbs were minorities (Cigar, 1995, p. 33). As the 
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other republics recoiled against this power move, they held referenda to 
decide whether to become independent countries. Slovenia and Croatia 
held their referenda and on June 25, 1991, simultaneously declared their 
independence from Yugoslavia. Slovenia, with a well-prepared national 
defense and a very small Serbian minority, was able to escape from a brief 
attempt by the Yugoslavian national army, the JNA, to keep it a part of 
Yugoslavia. Croatia, however, had a sizable Serbian minority adjacent to 
the Bosnian republic, which was at that time still united with Serbia as a 
part of Yugoslavia. War broke out in the republic of Croatia immediately 
following that country’s declaration of independence. The conflict would 
foreshadow Serbian actions and motives in the Bosnian conflict, which 
was now less than a year away. 
 
A warning: “Yugoslavia’s” war with Croatia 
 The Croatian conflict featured several Serb actions that would 
recur in the Bosnian conflict. First, propaganda spread about a genocide 
about to take place against the Serbs living in the republic of Croatia due 
to extreme nationalist elements there (Mestrovic, 1996, p. 58). The 
propaganda emotionally evoked the past, claiming the newly formed 
government of Croatia was just a reincarnation of the Croatian Ustasa 
(often spelled Ustashe, or Ustasha) government of World War II, which 
did in fact systematically murder thousands of Serbs, Jews and gypsies 
(Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 235). Second, this use of Serbian nationalist 
propaganda would help organize Serbian militias both within Serbia and in 
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Croatia. These militias were extremely Serbian-nationalist in character, 
calling themselves Chetniks, historic fighters for a Greater Serbia who 
themselves systematically murdered thousands of Croats and Muslims 
during World War II (Cigar, 1995, p. 107).  
Third, while these Serbian militias were being armed and financed 
by the republic of Serbia, the Yugoslavian government, controlled by 
Serbia, demanded that Croatian militias and state defenses be disarmed. 
The republic would comply, hoping to avoid escalation and attack 
(Mestrovic, 1996, p. 63). Serbian militias, coupled with the Yugoslavian 
army – the JNA, which itself was made up almost entirely of Serbs – then 
attacked Croatia when it declared independence, quickly seizing the land 
of its heavily out-armed opponent. Serbian troops would seize land even in 
areas where Serbs were a small minority (ibid, p. 76). This land was 
declared its own separate republic with alliances to Serbia, in the Croatian 
case the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Having seized the areas of land in 
Croatia premeditatedly desired for the creation of a Greater Serbia, the 
Serbs then embarked on a policy of ethnic cleansing, a euphemism for 
genocide, by clearing out the non-Serbian population and destroying any 
evidence of its previous existence.  
 Specific instances of ethnic cleansing were highlighted in the 
Croatian war, serving as a warning to the outside world of what would 
happen in the Bosnian conflict. Indeed, “at the very outbreak, July 7, 
1991, of war with Croatia, Serbian forces expelled the inhabitants of the 
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Croatian-dominated village Celija, in the municipality of Vukovar, and 
burned the city…The Serbs committed other forced expulsions in Serbian-
controlled areas of Croatia as non-Serbs were evicted by paramilitary 
groups working in tandem with Serbian civilian officials in those areas” 
(Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 76). The non-governmental human rights 
organization Helsinki Watch (pp. 276-280) also documented summary 
executions of Croatian police officers in three Croatian towns, as well as 
the executions of Croatian civilians, mostly men, but also including 
women, children, and the elderly in eleven separate villages. The 
destruction of non-Serbian civilian homes was widespread in these 
villages, according the report. The Croatian town of Vukovar was nearly 
completely destroyed by Serbian artillery during a three-month siege, and 
300 non-Serbs were “summarily executed when the city of Vukovar was 
captured in mid-November” with 2,000 more missing after the city’s fall.  
 
 In many ways, what had just happened in neighboring Croatia could 
have been viewed as a dress rehearsal to genocide in Bosnia-
Herzegovina…In the end, the Serbs in the occupied territories—
comprising less than 5 percent of Croatia’s population—were left in 
control of well over a quarter of Croatia’s area. To achieve ethnic 
cleansing in an area where half the people were non-Serbs, the Serbs 
had expelled thousands of Croatians, as well as others (Hungarians, 
Slovaks, Ukrainians, and Gypsies), while killing many outright (Cigar, 
1995, p. 45).  
 
Atrocities that occurred during the Croatian war were not as well 
publicized in the media as those in Bosnia would be, due at least partially 
to focused media coverage of the Gulf War (Sadkovich, 1998, p. 104). The 
isolated incidents highlighted by Helsinki Watch, and reports on the 
expulsions of the non-Serb population, and the brutality of Vukovar, were 
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simply the most visible signs of a Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing that 
was much more widespread.  
 
The leveling of Vukovar, once a gracious town on the Danube, and the 
targeting of centuries-old monuments in Dubrovnik, Croatia’s most 
famous tourist resort, were only the most visible signs. Serb forces 
detained, tortured or slaughtered thousands of Croats whose only fault 
was their ethnic identity and their attempt to defend their villages  
(Gutman, 1993, p. xxvi). 
 
Like in the upcoming Bosnian war, the threat of U.S. intervention 
did not seem to make much of a difference to Serbian policy. While the 
Serbs were cautious at first because of fear of possible Western 
intervention due to Bush’s proclamation of a New World Order, “after it 
was clear no outside power would intervene, the (JNA) took the 
offensive…around the major Serb enclaves in Croatia” (ibid, p. xxvi). 
When the West did respond, its efforts ended up either hurting the 
victimized population or, at the very least, not helping them. For instance, 
the Croatians were harmed in their efforts to defend themselves when, in 
September 1991, the West implemented an arms embargo on all republics 
of Yugoslavia. This denied the severely out-armed Croatians the weapons 
they had been stripped of prior to the war, thus cementing Serbia’s 
immense arms advantage. When an international presence was in place its 
limited mandate meant it was unable to stop the Serb policy of ethnic 
cleansing from taking place. Indeed, “EC (the European Community) 
monitors stood by and counted as the Serbian-dominated army…expelled 
10,000 Croatians, the entire population of the east Croatian town of 
Ilok…” (ibid, p. xxvi).  
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Warnings in Bosnia  
 The evidence of deliberate ethnic cleansing by Serbian forces in 
Croatia had obvious implications for Bosnia, where an independence 
movement was taking place. As the war raged in Croatia, there was 
already ethnic-related violence occurring in Bosnia, as JNA reservists 
would harass non-Serbs in the city of Mostar and other parts of the 
country. “In late 1991, the predominantly Croatian village of Ravno (in 
Southern Bosnia) was pillaged and burned by JNA reserve soldiers and 
Serbian irregular troops” (Helsinki Watch, p. 25). After a cease-fire was 
declared in Croatia in February 1992, the international community placed 
increased attention on Bosnia, where the Serbian minority in the republic 
had already declared its own independent republic, and Bosnians had 
overwhelmingly voted for independence. By April 5, 1992, a day before 
Bosnia’s independence would be recognized internationally and war 
would officially break out, Serbian police had opened fire on 
demonstrators in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo (ibid, p. 29).  
 Indeed, Western leaders were well aware of the carnage that was 
about to ensue in Bosnia on the eve of the republic’s independence. By the 
arrival of April 6, 1992, the day of Bosnian independence, many Serbian 
militias similar to the ones organized in Croatia had formed in Bosnia with 
the help of the Serbian republic and the JNA (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003, p. 
181). Meanwhile, Serbian militias operating in Croatia had filtered into 
Bosnia (Cigar, 1995, p. 49). Moreover, leaders of the Bosnian Serb 
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movement were warning that if the Bosnian Serbs were not allowed to 
annex portions of Bosnia they felt belonged to the Serbs, then war would 
commence, and the Muslim community would ‘”disappear from the face 
of the Earth” (ibid, p. 37). Due to the fact that Bosnia was the most 
ethnically heterogeneous republic of Yugoslavia, with 31 percent of its 
population Serbian, 17 percent Croatian and 44 percent Bosnian Muslim, 
the possibility of larger amounts of violence and destruction occurring in 
Bosnia than had taken place in Croatia seemed almost certain. Indeed, “the 
war’s viciousness had been forecast so regularly and so vividly as to 
desensitize U.S. officials. By the time the bloodshed began, U.S. officials 
were almost too prepared: They had been reading warning cables for so 
long that nothing could surprise them” (emphasis hers) (Power, 2003, p. 
253). 
 Given this awareness, the United States and other governments 
should have at least had some contingency plan for action to prevent the 
worst from happening in Bosnia. Serbia, meanwhile, would follow the 
same plan in Bosnia that had worked so well for it Croatia – releasing 
propaganda about an oppressed Serbian minority, arming Serbian militias 
in conjunction with the JNA to protect this minority, disarming the 
republic, seizing land premeditatedly determined to be part of a Greater 
Serbia, and subsequently “cleansing” the non-Serb population from that 
land.  
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Apparently the 10,000 dead and 700,000 displaced from Croatia 
was not enough for the U.S. and other governments to take a proactive 
stance in Bosnia. Instead, while acknowledging Serb aggression in the 
Croatian conflict (Mestrovic, 1996, p. 38), U.S. officials deliberately 
chose not to get involved there, shifting the burden of diplomacy onto 
Europe and intentionally directing debate away from any sort of American 
intervention (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003, p. 195). Unfortunately for the Bush 
administration, and the Clinton administration that followed it, the 
Bosnian conflict would be much longer, much more brutal, and much 
better documented than the Croatian conflict. The United States, however, 
would not change its policy, only intervening more than three years after 
the commencement of war. By this time the Serbs had already “cleansed” 
the non-Serb population from 70 percent of the newly independent country 
of Bosnia. The United States and other governments had thus failed in 
their obligations to the Genocide Convention, one of the hallmarks of the 
post-World War II era and surely an integral part of the New World Order 
as described by George Bush following the Gulf War only one year prior. 
 
The Bosnian conflict: differences and similarities 
 As in Croatia, Serbian forces invaded to “protect the ‘endangered’ 
Serb minority’” in Bosnia once the republic had officially declared its 
independence on April 6, 1992 (Mestrovic, 1996, p. 35). However, unlike 
Croatia, Bosnia’s declaration of independence was met immediately with 
international recognition by many of the major countries of the world – 
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including the United States – making it harder for Serbia to justify its 
intervention in what was now a sovereign nation-state, not just a renegade 
republic. National sovereignty, after all, is one of the cornerstones of 
international law (Jackson, 2003, p. 277). Western leaders thought that 
immediate recognition of Bosnia would send a message to Serbia, 
preventing it from launching an attack similar to the one it had launched 
on Croatia. However, Milosevic had now learned that the rhetoric of the 
United States and its allies far outpaced action. Indeed, the condemnations 
of Serbian aggression by the international community that had marked the 
Croatian conflict had led to either no action or, at the very least, 
ineffectual international intervention in the form of sanctions and impotent 
monitoring patrols. The mere declaration of Bosnia as a member of the 
international community would not mean the international community 
would rise to defend it, Milosevic and other Serb leaders thought (Power, 
2003, p. 249).  
Also working in Milosevic’s favor was the international 
community’s continuation of the arms embargo to all republics of 
Yugoslavia, even after they declared their independence. This froze in 
place an immense arms advantage for Serbia, as Serbian dominance of the 
JNA meant it had access to Yugoslavia’s impressive arms supply. This 
would be a key element of the Bosnian war as the Yugoslavian army was 
one of Europe’s biggest, having, “during 45 years of peace…acquired an 
immense stockpile of conventional weapons to defend against a mythical 
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Soviet bloc attack” (Gutman, 1993, p. xxiii). Moreover, Bosnia had long 
been a strategic part of Yugoslavia, serving as a “principal site of federal 
army bases, munitions plants and vast underground arsenals.” A large 
amount of weapons was thus available to those advocating for Serbian 
sovereignty within Bosnia.  
To get around the issue of Bosnia’s new internationally recognized 
sovereignty, when Bosnia declared independence many of the JNA 
soldiers stationed in Bosnia – soldiers whose numbers had increased as the 
JNA withdrew from Croatia into Bosnia – simply “changed their shoulder 
patches and transformed themselves into the Army of the Serbian republic 
of Bosnia…This gave the Serb proxy army a ten-to-one margin over the 
(newly formed Bosnian) government ” (emphasis mine) (ibid, p. xxxiii). 
Bosnia was also placed at further disadvantage after many Muslims gave 
up their weapons after assurances from Serb forces that if they disarmed 
they would not be attacked, “much to their subsequent chagrin” (Cigar, 
1995, p. 109). Muslim leaders thus were only able to hope for 
international intervention to prevent the pending “catastrophe” of “total 
war” and break up of their country along ethnic lines (Gutman, 1993, p. 
8).  
 So, while the international recognition of Bosnia was supposed to 
hinder the overt use of the JNA for Serbian territorial gains, it ended up 
not hindering Serb efforts at all. The real effect of the international 
community was seen instead in its arms embargo, which left Bosnians 
 25 
unable to obtain arms and defend themselves and their newly recognized 
territory, a right guaranteed to all states by the U.N. charter. Just like in 
Croatia, with well-organized armed forces and an overwhelming arms 
advantage, Serbian “militias” were able to seize large swathes of territory 
with ease. Indeed, soon after combat commenced, the “militias” held 70 
percent of Bosnian territory, mainly in the northwestern and eastern 
sections of the country, where there were sizable Serbian minorities. But, 
since Serbs constituted only 31 percent of the population of Bosnia, and 
had been living with Bosnian Croats and Muslims for centuries, there was 
a tremendous amount of variation in the amount of Serbian population in 
the regions, cities, and even villages of these captured areas. Hence, once 
the militias assumed control of the territory, the process of ethnic 
cleansing had to began with earnest in order to achieve the goal of creating 
an ethnically pure Greater Serbia. Due to the large area and population 
that needed to be cleansed, and increased international attention, the 
events that would unfold in Bosnia over the next three years would be an 
obvious case of inaction by the U.S. and other government in the face of 
clear and substantial evidence of genocide (Rieff, 1995, p. 82).  
 Bosnian Serb leaders, however, would justify their military 
occupation of Bosnian territory by claiming it was the Muslims who were 
committing a genocide against the Serbs as well as systematically raping 
Serbian women. In fact, many of the propagandist claims by the Bosnian 
Serb leaders, such as these, would end up outlining what the Serbian 
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militias were doing to the non-Serb population in the Bosnian territories 
they occupied (Gutman, 1993, p. x). Serbian propaganda, like during the 
Croatian war, focused on past genocides allegedly perpetrated against the 
Bosnian Serb population. In this case, the propaganda claimed that the 
Bosnian Muslims had helped the Ustasa Croatian government in its 
genocide during World War II (ibid).  
In addition to the previously noted dissemination of anti-Islamic 
writings and declarations by Serbian intellectuals, politicians, and clergy 
(see above, pp. 12-16), propaganda also abounded surrounding the 
“historic wrong” perpetrated against the Serbs in 1389 when the Serbs lost 
the battle of Kosovo Polje, which ushered in centuries of Ottoman (and 
thus Muslim) rule. Not only did this misleading propaganda help convince 
Serbs to fight, but it would also later be used by politicians from the U.S. 
and other governments to justify not intervening. 
 Despite claims of injustices taking place against the Serbs in 
Bosnia, reports, both by non-profit organizations and the media as well as 
by the U.S. and other governments, would instead outline a Serbian policy 
of execution and rape of non-Serb civilians. These reports would soon add 
up to publicly prove a systematic effort by the Serbs to commit genocide 
against Bosnia’s non-Serb population, predominantly the Muslims, but 
also Croatians and other minorities who had for years existed in harmony 
together in the country of Yugoslavia. The U.S. government’s failure to 
live up to its international legal obligations under the Genocide 
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Convention and stop the Serbian-led genocide proved its unwillingness to 
move beyond strategic national interests, killing the questionable existence 
of the New World Order mere months after it had been declared by 
President Bush.  
 
II. Knowledge of Bosnian genocide 
 
Public evidence of genocide in Bosnia 
The Genocide Convention calls on states “to prevent and to 
punish” any attempt of genocide, which is defined as an “intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” 
(Blaustein et al, 1987, p. 100). Here, Bosnia differed tremendously from 
Rwanda and other historical cases of genocide, as through the reports by 
media and non-governmental organizations, there was enough publicly 
available evidence to deduce that the Serbs were committing genocide 
against the non-Serb population of Bosnia. 
 Reports of Serbian ethnic cleansing were widespread from the 
beginning of the conflict (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003, p. 195), however it 
was assumed to be similar in nature to those of the Croatian conflict: mass 
deportations, some executions, but nothing too severe or organized. 
Except for the occasional news reports about a shelling of Sarajevo, 
Bosnia’s capital, Bosnia was portrayed publicly as a chaotic civil war, 
where confusion reigned and it was impossible to determine who was 
responsible for reported atrocities. By May, however, reports were 
circulating within the press of summary executions of civilians committed 
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by Serbian forces (Burns, 1992). The news media picked up these stories 
about ethnic cleansing and possible genocide in full force in August of 
1992. This increase in media coverage was triggered by Roy Gutman’s 
accounts of forced deportations of Bosnian Muslims, which first ran in the 
newspaper Newsday in early July (Sadkovich, 1998, p. 108). The media 
really began to focus on the possibility of genocide occurring in Bosnia 
when Gutman published on August 3, 1992 witness’s accounts of a 
Serbian-run concentration camp for Bosnian Muslims. The idea of 
concentration camps returning to Europe seemed to spark the media’s 
attention, and following Gutman’s report newspapers averaged 25 stories a 
month on Bosnia for the rest of 1992, a jump from April and May 
averages of 8.5 per month (ibid, p. 108).  
 Gutman’s accounts, which earned him a Pulitzer Prize, outlined in 
generic terms the Serb policy of ethnic cleansing, which according to 
extensive interviews with refugees and Bosnian and Serbian officials 
followed a distinct pattern. Serbs would gain control of a town and then  
 
round up the wealthiest, the most educated, the most successful, and the 
political and religious leadership. In mostly Muslim eastern Bosnia, 
Serb paramilitary forces reportedly executed them in their villages. In 
some conquered areas of Northern Bosnia, they took them to camps 
where they were executed without judicial proceedings. But in 
northwestern Bosnia, a mainly Serb area including (the Bosnian town 
of) Prijedor, there (were) signs of a power struggle between the Serbs 
long entrenched in power, who favored judicial proceedings, and 
radicals, who preferred summary executions. The latter group 
apparently carried the day (Gutman, 1993, p. 110).      
 
 Gutman interviewed scores of refugees from the various 
concentration camps he could verify – Manjaca, Kereterm, and Omarska – 
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all located in northwestern Bosnia, as well as camps operating in the 
towns of Bosanski Samac, and Brcko, in northeastern Bosnia. Through 
refugee account he pieced together patterns of serial beatings, torture and 
executions. Gutman was only able to visit one concentration camp, 
Manjaca, where he was under constant armed guard and could not thus 
directly corroborate witness’ stories. However, through his interviews he 
was able to establish that prisoners at Manjaca would be selected at night 
by guards and never seen again. Gutman was not able to get to Bosanski 
Samac, but he did spend a night in Croatia across the river of the border 
town where he was able to here “the screams and wails of Muslim and 
Croat women and children detained by Serbians in Bosnia” (ibid, p. 53). 
Refugees in Bosanski Samac who made it across the river to Slavonski 
Samac, Croatia, told of trucks driving up to the police station in Bosanski 
Samac, delivering men who were to be beaten inside by the police. “Much 
of the treatment seemed to be standardized in camps across northern 
Bosnia, judging from accounts by former prisoners” (ibid, p. 55).  
 Gutman interviewed a former prisoner at the Kereterm 
concentration camp who said he buried Muslims from the camp who had 
been murdered by Serb guards. Among those buried by the former 
prisoner were children as young as two (ibid, p. 84). Other prisoners of the 
camps corroborated the former prisoner’s story and estimated that 
thousands had been murdered there. Prisoners recognized people there 
from the Bosnian villages of Biscani, Zecovi, Kozarac, and Carakovo, all 
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in northwest Bosnia, suggesting an organized effort to round up Muslims 
throughout an occupied territory and send them to local concentration 
camps. By far the worst camp Gutman described through witness accounts 
was Omarska, where “more that a thousand Muslim and Croat civilians 
were held in metal cages without sanitation, adequate food, exercise or 
access to the outside world” (ibid, 44). Ten to fifteen prisoners would be 
executed every day, with estimates of more than a thousand executed at 
Omarska alone. The rest were subject to daily beatings, and thousands 
more were estimated to have died from these beatings.  
 
All but a few detainees were civilians, mostly draft-age Muslim or 
Croat men, but there were many men under 18 or over 60, and a small 
number of women. The United States embassy in Zagreb (the capital of 
Croatia)…concluded there were massive atrocities occurring at 
Omarska and other camps in the surrounding towns….’The Nazis had 
nothing on these guys. I’ve seen report of individual acts of barbarity of 
a kind that hasn’t come up in State Department cable traffic in 20 
years,’ said a top official at the U.S. embassy, who spoke on condition 
of anonymity (ibid, p. 91).   
 
Some of the ‘individual acts of barbarity’ included reports of 
children being impaled on spikes, people having electric drills bored 
through their chests (Gutman, 1993, p. 41), “fathers and sons orally 
castrating each other and preteen girls raped in front of their parents” 
(Power, 2003, p. 314). After international outcry following Gutman’s 
stories on Kereterm and Omarska, Bosnian Serb authorities closed the 
camps, transferring all prisoners to Trnopolje, another Serb-run 
concentration camp in northwestern Bosnia. “A large number of detainees, 
possibly as many as 1,000, seem to have disappeared without a trace when 
Omarska was closed” (ibid, p. 91). Witnesses said that at the Trnopolje 
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camp “more than 200…inmates were shot and dumped in a ravine” while 
Serb security forces escorted other prisoners out of Serbian-controlled 
Bosnia, dislocating them permanently from their native homelands (ibid, 
p. 85). Gutman’s accounts of the Brcko concentration camp revealed 
estimates of 3,000 people executed by either throat slitting or firing squad 
during a six-week period between early May and mid-June 1992 (ibid, p. 
51).    
Other journalists were also writing about the Serbian policy of 
ethnic cleansing. John F. Burns was one of the first to do so when, on May 
22, 1992, he wrote in The New York Times about reports of summary 
executions of Muslim refugees by Serb forces in the eastern Bosnian 
border town of Zvornik. The Washington Post, too, was telling similar 
tales (Battiata, 1992). By August, nearly all media were reporting accounts 
such as ones in Newsweek (Watson, 1992) of summary executions of 
prisoners, Serb soldiers giving hungry Muslim boys bread sprayed with 
insecticide, and women being raped then doused with gasoline and set on 
fire.  
 Helsinki Watch, meanwhile, released a report in August of 1992, 
which further highlighted accounts of summary executions of civilians by 
Serb forces. The executions took place in the village of Zaklopaca, in 
eastern Bosnia, the Vlasic Plateau in central Bosnia, and the village of 
Skelani in eastern Bosnia in the municipality of Srebrenica. “The number 
of abuses was probably much greater than those seen by Helsinki Watch 
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as Serbian forces and the ferocity of the conflict prevented the 
organization from having free access to areas within which war crimes 
were reported to have taken place” (Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 6). 
Journalists had similar problems, which subsequently limited their ability 
to report on claims of civilian executions by Serbian forces (Sadkovich, 
1998, p. 112).  
 In addition to the executions, there were also numerous public 
reports about other atrocities committed by the Serbs in their policy of 
ethnic cleansing. One repeated claim was that of the systematic rape of 
tens of thousands of Bosnian women. Again, Gutman was the first to 
break this story, this time on August 8, 1992. In a series of stories he 
detailed the accounts of 40 Bosnian Muslim women who were raped when 
their town, Brezovo Polje, in northeastern Bosnia, was captured by 
Serbian forces in the early summer of 1992.  
  
According to the victims, preparations for the mass rape began early on 
the morning of June 17 when Serb soldiers in army uniforms and masks 
piled out of their minivans and rounded up the Muslims of Brezovo 
Polje for ethnic cleansing. They loaded the able-bodied men from 18 to 
60 onto buses and sent them (away) for interrogation… Then (the Serb 
soldiers) packed about 1,000 women, children and old people into eight 
buses, drove them around the countryside for two days…to the nearby 
town of Ban Brdo, the victims said. Serb soldiers returning from the 
front invaded the buses every night and led off women and girls to an 
unknown location at knifepoint, recalled Senada, 17. ‘They threw them 
out in the morning and their clothes were torn, and they were covered 
with blood,’ she said…’The deepest hurt seems to be moral shame. 
These women were from the countryside where premarital sex is 
prohibited, said (Dr. Melika) Kreitmayer, (a gynecologist who 
examined the girls) who confirmed that all but one had been virgins at 
the time they were raped. ‘Most of them think they have been ruined 
for life’…The victims say that right now they would like to be 
anywhere but in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most say that once they leave 
here, they do not plan to return ever again (Gutman, 1993, pp. 70-73).  
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 Gutman documented similar cases of rape in Liplje, a village in 
north central Bosnia of fewer than 500, where “practically every woman 
was raped,” according to medical examiners (ibid, p. 74). Gutman 
described more organized forms of rape committed by Serb soldiers, 
documenting an actual concentration camp of Bosnian Muslim women 
strictly for raping purposes. His articles focused on the Partizan sports 
center in the town of Foca, in southeastern Bosnia, where, “for two 
months in 1992, between June and August, (the sports center) functioned 
as a rape camp, holding 74 people, including about 60 women” (ibid, p. 
157). Three of Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic’s top associates 
were admitted by Karadzic to be in charge of Foca during this time. 
Similarly, a Newsweek article (Watson, 1992) reported claims of women 
chained to fences “who were stripped to their waists” with a sign that read 
“for all use”, as well as reports of Bosnian Muslim sex slaves who were 
held for months until they became visibly pregnant, at which point they 
were “set free to ‘have Serbian babies’” (ibid). While each account was 
told by a refugee and could not be directly confirmed, they would spark 
government investigations, which would by and large corroborate 
journalists’ accounts. Indeed, the United Nations in January 1993, released 
a report that concluded that the Serbs had committed an “organized, 
systemic policy” of rape in Bosnia (Cushman & Mestrovic, 1996, p. 15). 
This conclusion alone should have qualified Serb actions in Bosnia as 
genocidal, as the Genocide Convention defines a genocide as a deliberate 
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attempt to “prevent births within” another population (Blaustein et al, 
1987, p. 100). 
 Another Serb action of ethnic cleansing commonly described in 
newspaper and non-governmental account, and thus publicly available, 
was the policy of forced deportation of non-Serb populations living in 
Serb-held areas of Bosnia. Again, Gutman led the way on many of these 
reports, but other journalists also joined him, and after August 1992 
reports of these activities, outlawed by the Geneva Conventions, were 
widespread (Sadkovich, 1998, p. 108).  
Examples of such practices might start small, such as in cases in 
northwestern Bosnia where local Serb governments would issue orders 
that placed non-Serbs in inferior positions. For instance, in the town of 
Celinac, near Banja Luka, Bosnia’s second largest city,  
 
the Serb ‘war presidency’ issued a directive giving all non-Serbs 
‘special status.’ Because of ‘military actions,’ a curfew was imposed 
from 4 p.m. to 6 a.m. Non-Serbs were forbidden to: meet in cafes, 
restaurants, or other public places; bathe or swim in the Vrbanija or 
Josavka Rivers; hunt or fish; move to another town without 
authorization; carry a weapon; drive or travel by car; gather in groups 
of more than three men; contact relatives outside Celinac (all household 
visits (had to be) reported); use means of communication other than the 
post office phone; wear uniforms: military, police or forest guard; sell 
real estate or exchange homes without approval…(In other cases) a 
Serb radio broadcast would inform the citizenry that a local factory had 
introduced a quota to limit the number of Muslims or Croat employees 
to 1 percent of the overall workforce (Power, 2003, 250).  
 
In Banja Luka itself, the Serbs took control of the locally elected 
government and then put a crisis committee in its place, which fired non-
Serbs from important managerial and senior positions within local 
government and companies. “The only non-Serbs in Banja Luka whose 
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earnings were unaffected by the committee’s actions were those who had 
not risen above menial employment” (Rieff, 1995, p. 84).  
Other towns and villages outside the northwest of Bosnia faced 
more severe tactics. In a similar pattern executed time and again 
“paramilitary or JNA troops were bussed into a certain city, surrounding 
it” (Helsinki Watch, 1992, pp. 50-62). Serbian villagers would then 
evacuate, Serbian forces would then shell the town, and then either invade 
it (ibid), or siege it until the population was staved off (Cigar, 1995, p. 56).  
In the end, once a town was under Serbian control, either through 
civilian or military means, a similar end result would follow including 
some or all of the following consequences as described by numerous 
sources that were publicly available in 1992: summary executions and 
village burning (ibid), including the estimated 3,000 non-Serbs killed in 
the town of Kozarac in northwestern Bosnia; civilians driven at gunpoint 
out of villages and towns to trains for mass deportations out of Serbian-
controlled Bosnia (Gutman, 1993, p. 38); separation and/or deportation, 
with Muslim men going to concentration camps, women going to rape 
camps, and all other women, children, and elderly being transported out of 
Serbian-controlled Bosnia (ibid, p. 49); and the holding of non-Serbs 
civilians in their towns to be used as bargaining chips for Serbian 
prisoners of war (Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 69).  
Often times deportation would be on sealed boxcar trains 
(reminiscent of the Holocaust) that would carry thousands of non-Serbs 
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out of Serb-held territory in Bosnia (Gutman, 1993, p. 49). In many cases, 
Serbs would force the non-Serbs to sign documents saying that they had 
been treated well and were willingly leaving their homelands (ibid, p. 25). 
Once this procedure had been established and was known, Serb efforts 
would often times not be needed as Muslims would flee on their own 
accord prior to Serb invasion, fearing the consequences of staying behind 
(Battiata, 1992).  
With these practices in place, it is no wonder that, during the 
course of the war, over 2,000,000 people were displaced, nearly half of 
Bosnia’s population, with an estimated 628,000 displaced by mid-1992 
(Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 141). This was the goal, not consequence, of 
Serbian action. The ultimate goal of the Serbs was, apparently to 
repopulate the ‘ghost towns’ of ethnically cleansed portions of Bosnia 
(Burns, 1992). A short list of such towns and areas included in the media 
and non-governmental reports listed above, and thus publicly available in 
1992, includes: Prijedor, Kozarac, and Banja Luka, in northwestern 
Bosnia, Sarajevo, the Drina River Valley, Zvornik, Bratunac, Vlasenica, 
and Visegrad in central and eastern Bosnia, Bijeljina, Kozluk, in 
northeastern Bosnia, Mostar, and Foca in southern Bosnia, and the list 
goes on and on.  
With the descriptions above, this would most likely qualify as a 
policy of genocide, as the Genocide convention defines a genocide, among 
other qualifications, as “causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
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members of” another group of people, and “deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction 
in whole or in part” (Blaustein et al, 1987, p. 100). Forced removal of non-
Serb population from their jobs and their homelands could probably be 
described as serious bodily or mental harm to members of Bosnia’s non-
Serb population, and could at least plausibly be seen as part of a deliberate 
scheme by the Serbs to bring about the physical destruction of the 
Bosnia’s non-Serb population.  
While this process of summary executions, rape, and displacement 
was taking place, Serb troops would also destroy any evidence of 
sometimes centuries of non-Serb existence, which could likewise be seen 
as an attempt to aid in the physical destruction of Bosnia’s non-Serb 
population. This policy, too, could be gleaned from publicly available 
reports having to do with Bosnia in 1992 and 1993. For example, in and 
around Foca, Serbs forces destroyed all fourteen mosques in the town, 
some which were over five centuries old, including the oldest mosque in 
Bosnia (Gutman, 1993, p. 24, 160); in Kozarac, the town was surrounded 
by Serb artillery and completely destroyed (Battiata, 1992); in Sarajevo, 
Serb artillery badly damaged mosques there, as well as city hall and the 
national library (Gutman, 1993, p. 79); over the course of 1993, 200 out of 
202 mosques and 96 percent of all Catholic churches (the Croats being 
predominantly Catholic) in Banja Luka were destroyed by Serbs. By the 
beginning of September 1992, Bosnian officials estimated that the 
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majority of mosques in Serb-held areas were destroyed, having been 
leveled and their rubble removed (Gutman, 1993, p. 83).  
 
Indeed…churches and cultural monuments were the constant and 
cynical targets of the Serbs. Four hundred Croatian churches have been 
destroyed (wrote Georgie Anne Geyer, in a October 21, 1992 column); 
the Serb gunmen have consistently used UN Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) flags, supposedly protecting historic 
monuments, as markers to destroy those monuments. Over and over in 
the smitten cities, the gunmen would hit a church steeple with artillery, 
and journalist at the scene could hear the ‘yea, yea’ in the 
background… (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 81).  
 
 These policies of murder, rape, forced deportations, and cultural 
destruction by the Serbs were so pervasive that many in the media 
concluded that they had to be organized and deliberate. Media reports 
described “Serbs working from an ethnic map” with the overall goal of 
creating “corridors” that would connect Serbia with Serb-held territories in 
Croatia seized during the previous war there (Burns, 1992). These 
“corridors” would consist of half to two-thirds of Bosnia, according to 
maps produced by Serbian officials (Gutman, 1993, p. 9).  
Most importantly was that, unlike in Rwanda and other cases of 
genocide in the 20th century, outside observers had been in Bosnia to 
document these actions and bring it back to the United States for public 
consumption.  
 
In contrast to a previous age, Western observers have been literally 
bombarded with information about the most recent wave of genocide in 
Europe. Atrocities have been recorded in sound bytes of human history 
for all to see….In executing a policy of genocide, the Serbs’ methods 
are a matter of public record: deportation, torture, mutilations, death 
camps, rape/death camps, and mass executions….While…genocide is 
tragic, some can always say in self-defense that ‘we did not 
know.’…One thing is certain: the butchering of innocent people in 
Bosnia has gone on under the watchful gaze of the West. This time, we 
know  (emphasis theirs) (Cushman & Mestrovic, 1996, pp. 6, 7, 10). 
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 However, despite the preponderance of evidence publicly 
available, there was no intervention in Bosnia for over three years. To 
counter the publicly available information that pointed to genocide in 
Bosnia, the U.S. and other governments came up with excuses to rule out 
intervention and the enforcement of the Genocide Convention. These 
excuses, as will be demonstrated later on, placated the American public. 
At the very least, claims of “if only we knew” and “never again” would 
ring hallow in Bosnia, as the information on the public record in 1992 and 
1993 clearly points to a policy of Serb-led genocide. However, often times 
media reports, which are largely based on the second-hand accounts of 
survivors, are deemed hard-to-believe and possibly made up (Power, 2003, 
p. 95). However, the majority of the claims in the publicly available 
information – claims of executions, rape, forced migration, and cultural 
destruction perpetrated by Serbs against Bosnia’s non-Serb population – 
would be confirmed by public and private reports by the U.S. and other 
governments, as will be demonstrated in the next section of this paper. 
This helps reinforce the conclusion that the U.S. and other governments 
refused to live up to the normative codes of international law and the 
“New World Order” during the Bosnian war.  
  
What the U.S. (and other) governments knew 
Over the three-year course of the war, the U.S. and other 
governments would conclude privately and declare publicly that a Serb-
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led policy of aggression, atrocity, and, finally, genocide, was taking place 
against the non-Serb population in Bosnia. 
International government attention had been focused on 
Yugoslavia since the start of the Croatian war, and by September 1991, an 
arms embargo was in place covering the entire country, including the 
breakaway republics (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 4). While a 
diplomatic measure only, this did have grave effects on the situation in 
Bosnia. As stated above, the arms embargo froze in place a tremendous 
weapons advantage for Serbian forces at the expense of the disarmed, 
succeeding republics.  
Troop deployment by the international government started 
formally in Yugoslavia on February 21, 1992, with Security Council 
resolution 743 calling for the creation of the United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR), to be deployed to Croatia to monitor the ceasefire 
there and protect the minority Serbs. In April, when hostilities started in 
Bosnia, the U.N. deployed a small force to the area. Also in April, when 
Bosnia declared its independence, the United States and European allies 
officially recognized it as an independent country, with the apparent aim 
of staving off a Serbian-led invasion against a sovereign state, something 
forbidden in international law (Power, 2003, p. 249). Again, as shown 
above, Serbia got around this by having its troops simply switch uniforms 
or the patches on their uniforms to become either Serbian militias or 
Bosnian Serb troops, ostensibly to create the image of a civil war as 
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opposed to a “war of aggression”, which would be internationally 
condemned  (Gutman, 1993, p. xxxiii; Helsinki Watch, 1992; Cigar, 
1995).  
Thus, as the war commenced in Bosnia, the international 
community was largely involved, and had a physical presence in the newly 
independent country. Indeed, the U.S. government had been watching 
closely as events surrounding the Bosnian war commenced, and officials 
with the government were well aware of the Serb policy of ethnic 
cleansing and the ferocity that the coming Bosnian war would entail 
(Power, 2003, p. 253). Indeed, only a week into the war, on April 14, 
1992, an information memo sent through the State Department to Bush’s 
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger (who would become 
Secretary of State that December) bluntly described Serbian war aims as 
the partitioning of Bosnia. “‘The clear intent of Serbian use of force is to 
displace non-Serbs” the memo stated “forcibly partitioning [Bosnia] and 
effecting large forced population transfers…from mixed areas (including 
areas where Serbs are a minority) to consolidate Bosnian Serb claims to 
some 60% of Bosnian territory…in a manner which would create a 
‘Serbian Bosnia’” (ibid, p. 264).  
This analysis, sent directly to the second in command at the State 
Department should have been enough to tip the U.S. government about the 
possibility of genocide taking place in Bosnia. However, as the document 
stated, the expectation was for “large forced population transfers”, not 
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genocide. While some may argue that forced population transfers are 
policies of genocide, others may not consider these actions genocidal or a 
situation where governments should be required to intervene under the 
Genocide Convention. However, the State Department did have its eye on 
the situation, and it came to the same conclusion that Helsinki Watch had 
about the Serb policy of ethnic cleansing. Indeed, in the beginning of the 
war, the U.S. government had already determined that Serbs military 
actions would follow a similar pattern, unleashing an artillery attack upon 
a village first, then an infantry assault by paramilitaries. Once a village 
was subdued militarily, “a cadre of paramilitaries and regulars stayed to 
‘mop up’”, looting valuables, shooting livestock, and blowing up houses. 
Armed soldiers were killed, unarmed men were rounded up and deported, 
women and children sent into the countryside. The same pattern followed 
in all the villages the Serb forces invaded, in Brcko in northern Bosnia, 
Zvornik in eastern Bosnia, and Prijedor in northwestern Bosnia (ibid, p. 
266). According to Jon Western, the State Department official in charge of 
compiling and analyzing intelligence from the Bosnian conflict: 
 
We could see the attacks coming by watching our computer terminal 
screens, by scanning the satellite imagery, or often just by watching 
television. We knew exactly what the Bosnian Serbs were going to do 
next, and there was nothing we could do. Imagine you could say, ‘In 
two days this village is going to die,’ and there was nothing you could 
do about it. You just sat there, waited for it to happen and dutifully 
reported it up the chain’ (266).  
 
By late May, officers with the State Department were investigating 
refugee claims of systematic executions and rapes by Serb forces against 
non-Serb populations. The officers pored over nearly one thousand daily 
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documents churned out on Bosnia by open sources – media, human rights 
organizations – as well as classified sources – field reporting, satellite 
images, “refugee testimony, and telephone and radio intercepts” (ibid, p. 
264). By July 4, 1992, the officers were able to conclude that the complete 
destruction of non-Serb life – the capture of non-Serb soldiers and male 
civilians, the forced exodus of non-Serb women and children, the 
destruction of non-Serb property – in essence the Serbian policy of ethnic 
cleansing – had, in all likelihood been “planned and coordinated” by Serb 
forces (ibid, p. 266). Thus, the U.S. government, by early July 1992, had 
determined that, in all likelihood, there was a genocide taking place in 
Bosnia. 
Also by July 1992, the U.S. State Department had determined the 
existence in Bosnia of what looked like Serb-run concentration camps for 
non-Serb populations, reports of which would be revealed publicly more 
than a month later (Power, 2003, p. 266). Despite these reports, and the 
conclusion that a Serb-led genocide was taking place in Bosnia by officers 
with the State Department, the U.S, government took no action; State 
Department officials had to wait for the media to pick up the stories they 
already knew about – of the complete destruction of non-Serb villages, of 
concentration camps for soldiers and civilians alike – for reaction to take 
place (Kenney, 1992). 
Inaction in the face of knowledge was not solely U.S. policy. The 
United Nations also knew about Serb-run concentration camps by July 3, 
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1992, a full month before their existence would be exposed publicly. 
Moreover, in a memorandum dated July 1, 1992, from Bosnia the United 
Nations explained the Serb policy of ethnic cleansing by detailing the 
targeting of Muslim groups for transport to concentration camps and 
prisons in order to “establish a Serbian republic…free of Muslims…The 
treatment of Muslims and other minorities in the camp is reportedly 
atrocious, with regular beatings, deprivation of food and water, poor 
shelter, etc” (Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 229).  
When the knowledge of the camps became public, international 
leaders finally stood tough and demanded access to the camps for 
monitoring purposes. However, following their public revelation, the 
camps were closed or moved, their inhabitants either transferred to other 
camps, or simply disappeared (Gutman, 1993, p. 87). Once media and 
international monitors gained access to the camps, the Serbs had moved all 
prisoners out and installed beds and facilities to make it look as though it 
were a usual detention facility for prisoners, not the focal points of Nazi-
like extermination centers that both media reports claimed, and 
government reports would later acknowledge (Honig and Both, 1996, p. 
77).    
Through public condemnation and warnings along the lines of “we 
will not rest until the international community has gained access to any 
and all detention camps”, by President Bush, the United States showed the 
influence it could have on the conflict in Bosnia. These declarations had 
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closed the most egregious of the Serb-run concentration camps. The U.S. 
and its allies had also shown their influence in other areas, as threats of 
intervention were followed by Serb cooperation with international 
humanitarian relief efforts (Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 193). Yet following 
the focused diplomatic attention on the concentration camps, time would 
pass, U.S. attention would shift elsewhere, and the Serbs would continue 
their operation of concentration camps in other parts of Bosnia. Indeed, 
the continued existence of Serb-run concentration camps was widely 
known by the U.S. government, which, “within six weeks of Bush’s 
pledge…had compiled a list of more than 200 camps (that were still 
operating)” (Power, 2003, p. 281). 
Reports of genocide, however, would largely come from the media 
and non-governmental organizations such as Helsinki Watch. Besides the 
detailed accounts already described of execution of civilians, blockage of 
humanitarian aid, and other war crimes committed by Serb forces, 
Helsinki Watch declared in its August 1992 report that the “most 
egregious and overwhelming number of violations of the rules of war” 
were “committed by Serbian forces” (Helsinki Watch, 6). The report 
outlined the use of indiscriminate bombing, shelling, and attacking of 
unarmed Bosnian towns, cities, and villages by Bosnian Serbs with the 
goal of terrorizing and inducing the flight or surrender of the Bosnian 
population (ibid, p. 12). The report described the deliberate bombing of 
non-Serbian cultural monuments by Serb forces. The report also recorded 
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the orders of head Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic to bomb residential 
areas in Sarajevo and “burn it all” (ibid, pp. 107-110). This led the 
organization to conclude its report with the declaration that genocide was 
occurring in Bosnia, and that it was being committed by Serb forces.  
On August 25, 1992, George Kenney, desk officer in the State 
Department who was in charge of the Bush administration’s public 
statements about Bosnia resigned in protest of Bush’s policies in Bosnia. 
He was the first of three other State Department officers to resign over 
U.S. policy in Bosnia over the course of the next 12 months. “It was the 
largest wave of resignations in State Department history. Each officer left 
due to what they felt was the “timid” U.S. policy in the face of clear 
“aggression and genocide” caused by the Serbs (Power, 2003, p. 315). 
Writing later about his decision to resign in the November 1992 issue of 
Washington Monthly, Kenney said officials within the State Department 
were not even investigating reports of war crimes due to pressure from 
officials higher up in the hierarchy to avoid any presentation of evidence 
that would lead to an increased probability of U.S. intervention. “A 
defeatist mentality pervaded the State Department to the lowest ranks; the 
ethos was that because we can’t get involved, we won’t get involved” 
(Kenney, 1992).  
Despite its initial reticence, “by the end of 1992 the State 
Department, from its own interviews, no longer doubted that Serbs and to 
a much lesser extent Croats and Muslims had carried out massive 
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atrocities” in Bosnia (Gutman, 1993, p. xxxvi). This led to the public 
declaration by then-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger of seven 
Bosnian Serbs as potential war criminals, including head Bosnian Serb 
General Ratko Mladic and Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic. In 
November 1992, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who was appointed in 1992 by the 
UN Human Rights Commission to investigate the allegations of massive 
human rights abuse concluded: “The collected evidence leaves no doubt as 
to who is responsible for the horror: the Serbian political and military 
leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina, supported by authorities of the Serbian 
Republic” (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 45). Yet despite their status 
as potential war criminals, Karadzic and Mladic would continue on for the 
next three years as head negotiators with the international community at 
peace and ceasefire agreements.  
As the war staggered on into 1993, and the Serbs continued to 
cleanse occupied territories of non-Serb population, more and more 
reports of a probable genocide, this time from official government reports, 
began to be made public. In January 1993, the U.S. government released a 
report to the United Nations concluding that 80 to 90 percent of the war 
crimes committed in Bosnia were being committed by Serb forces 
(Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 15). Government interviewers tasked 
with investigating claims of executions in the Serb-run concentration 
camps concluded that as many as 5,000 men were slaughtered at one site 
alone; more than 70,000 civilians were still being illegally held (Gutman, 
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1993, p. 139). In January 1993, the European Community released a report 
concluding that at least 20,000 Muslim women had been raped in 1992, 
with some of the rapes occurring in special Serb-run detention centers set 
up for the women (Gutman, 1993, p. 146).  
On February 22, 1993, the UN Security Council authorized a 
tribunal to investigate allegations of war crimes in Bosnia, the first such 
international tribunal since the Nuremberg Tribunal following World War 
II. In April 1993, the International Court of Justice in The Hague 
demanded Serbia take measure to “prevent genocide” from taking place in 
Bosnia (Mestrovic, 1996, p. 4). “As of June 1993, the U.S. Department of 
State had submitted to the United Nations eight reports on atrocities and 
war crimes in former Yugoslavia…[and] 88% were attributable to Serbs, 
7% to Bosnian Muslims, and 5% to Croats…” (Mestrovic, 1996, p. 7).  
Due to these reports, Warren Christopher, the new secretary of 
state under Bill Clinton, came under increased pressure by the media and 
Congressional leaders to declare whether the Commander-in-Chief 
believed that genocide, as opposed to just war crimes, was taking place in 
Bosnia. Publicly, Christopher continued to dance around such a 
declaration, claiming acts “tantamount to genocide” were taking place 
(Power, 2003, p. 319). However, privately, Christopher had received a 
memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research Toby Gati, which declared that the Serbs had violated the 
Genocide Convention by “killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, 
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inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, 
(and) imposing measures to prevent birth…against Bosnia’s Muslims 
(simply) because they were Muslims” (ibid). Public declarations by Serb 
leaders and soldiers, expressing intent to eradicate Muslims and create an 
ethnically homogeneous state, plus the systematic pattern of the violations 
occurring in Serb-held areas of Bosnia, led Gati to conclude that the Serbs 
had undertaken such actions “with the intent of destroying the Muslim 
group”. Thus, by the middle of 1993, the United States had again privately 
declared that a genocide, perpetuated by the Serbs, was taking place in 
Bosnia, although this time the declarations were emanating from 
diplomats at the highest levels of governance (ibid). 
More evidence of official government knowledge of the genocide 
in Bosnia continued to be made public both before, and after, the middle 
of 1993 when Secretary of State was told that genocide was in fact 
occurring. A series of reports issued by the European Community from 
February 1993 to April 1994 documented the destruction of 200 out of 202 
mosques and 96 percent of Catholic churches in Serb-controlled areas of 
Banja Luka, in northwestern Bosnia. Many of the mosques dated from the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 
47).  
In May of 1994, a U.N. Commission issued a report that concluded 
the majority of concentration camps in Bosnia were instruments of the 
Serb “policy of ‘ethnic purification’ through terror, rape, and slaughter” 
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(Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 53). While Croatian and Bosnian forces 
also operated camps, “no policy or pattern of wrongdoing could be 
identified in the detention camps” operated by them, the commission’s 
report said (ibid). The report offered continued confirmation of Serb war 
policy to conquer a town militarily, and then round up the population en 
masse and interrogate them in a process that entailed “rape, other torture, 
and slaughter…Men between the ages of sixteen (or younger) and sixty 
were separated from older men, women, and children. These men, 
considered of military age, were transferred to larger, more heavily 
guarded camps, where tortures and murders were the rule”, the report 
concluded (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 53). The U.N. report stated 
that the goal of the Serb-run concentration camps seemed “to have been to 
eliminate the non-Serbian leadership, political leaders, officials from the 
courts and administration, academics and other intellectuals, religious 
leaders, key business people and artists – the backbone of the Muslim and 
Croatian communities”; these groups were targeted “for destruction”, the 
report said (Honig and Both, 1996, p. 77).  
A UN report on rape in the Bosnian conflict in March of 1995 
found that “Serb atrocities strongly suggest a systematic rape and sexual 
policy against Muslim women” (Mestrovic, 1996, p. 7). In March 1995, 
Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia prior its 
breakup called Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic an “architect of 
massacres in the Muslim villages, ethnic cleansing, and artillery attacks on 
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civilian populations….He invited comparison with a monster from another 
generation, Heinrich Himmler” (ibid, p. 169).   
In March 1995, the only real public declaration of genocide taking 
place in Bosnia by the U.S. government occurred when a classified CIA 
report was leaked to The New York Times that stated that “the Central 
Intelligence Agency has concluded that 90 percent of the acts of "ethnic 
cleansing" were carried out by Serbs and that leading Serbian politicians 
almost certainly played a role in the crimes (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 148). 
“The C.I.A. report, based on aerial photography and what one senior 
official called ‘an enormous amount of precise technical analysis,’ also 
concludes that while war crimes were by no means committed exclusively 
by Serbs, they (the Serbs) were the only party involved in a systematic 
attempt to eliminate all traces of other ethnic groups from their territory” 
(emphasis mine) (ibid). The C.I.A. officials concluded that the contents of 
the comprehensive review of war crimes by the agency led them to 
conclude “virtually conclusively that Serbian leaders could be indicted” on 
charges of genocide (ibid). In April 1995, the International War Crimes 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia formally indicted Bosnian Serb 
President Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic as 
war criminals who orchestrated genocide in Bosnia (Cushman and 
Mestrovic, 1996, p. 20).  
Thus, high-ranking officials in the U.S. and other governments had 
reached the conclusion– both confidentially, and publicly – that the Serbs 
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had committed a systematic and organized policy of genocide in Bosnia. 
However, despite U.S. pledges to a “New World Order” and the Genocide 
Convention, that there was no forceful intervention during the first three 
years of the Bosnian conflict. The U.S. and other governments’ continued 
refusal to intervene and halt the genocide demonstrated how Bush’s 
supposed New World Order applied only to specific, probably oil-filled, 
parts of the world.    
 
III. Nonintervention 
 
The non-forceful interventions of the U.S. and other governments 
For nearly three years, the U.S. and other governments would 
pursue a strict policy of nonintervention in Bosnia, avoiding any forceful 
military deployment or action that would benefit one faction over the 
other. This despite the fact that the U.S. and other governments had 
publicly and privately declared that the Serbs were committing a genocide 
against the non-Serb population in Bosnia.  
From the beginning the United States was reticent to respond in 
Yugoslavia the way it had in the first Persian Gulf War. U.S. diplomatic 
efforts had been limited when the republics of Slovenia and Croatia broke 
away from Yugoslavia in 1991, as Secretary of State James Baker called 
for the territorial unity of Yugoslavia but claimed that the United States 
had “no dog in this fight” (Mestrovic, 1996, p. 38). The main diplomatic 
efforts in the Croatian war were instead made by European states through 
the collective actions of the European Community, which at this time was 
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strengthening due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independence of 
Eastern European countries, and the organization’s movements towards 
unification (Power, 2003, p. 258). As the E.C. diplomatic mission began in 
Yugoslavia just prior to the war in Croatia, Jacques Poos, one of the 
diplomats on the mission, proclaimed this to be “Europe’s hour” (Usborne, 
1991). Europe would remain the main diplomatic player in Bosnia as well, 
and the E.C.’s efforts in Croatia foreshadowed the nature of its 
involvement in Bosnia.  
In Croatia, the Europeans worked persistently for ceasefires. While 
they would condemn Serbia as the aggressor, they would only condemn, 
watching as Serbian troops and irregulars seized large portions of Croatian 
territories (Fisher, 1991). Starting in August of 1991, there would be truce 
agreements almost monthly, followed by Serbian violations, international 
condemnations of Serbian violations, and the restarting of peace 
negotiations (ibid; Harden, 1991; Gardner et. al, 1991; Associated Press, 
1991). By November 1991 12 ceasefires had been signed, only to be 
broken immediately afterwards over the five months of war. The best the 
European Community could offer was tough diplomatic penalties, with 
economic sanctions and an arms embargo against all of Yugoslavia, which 
included the republic of Croatia as well as Serbia.  
This E.C,’s central focus on avoiding intervention while working 
diplomatically to end the conflict was a pattern that continued into the 
Bosnian war, even though the community had changed to the European 
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Union. Before the Bosnian war began, the European Union was 
negotiating for the ethnic division of Bosnia along the lines of its three 
ethnicities – Croat, Serb, and Muslim – in order to avoid what many knew 
was going to be a much bloodier war (Reuter, 1992b). When the war 
commenced in April after recognition of Bosnian sovereignty by the 
international community, the European Union once again took the lead in 
the diplomatic efforts. And, once again, reports abounded of Serbian 
aggression. The situation, though, was much more dire than it had been in 
Croatia, as larger areas of land were involved in war, which meant much 
more conflict and refugees. But the Europeans continued on the same 
course, negotiating peace agreement after peace agreement that would all 
consistently be broken by Serbian aggression (Tanner, 1992; Silber, 1992; 
Jackson, 1992).  
The cycle of negotiated and broken ceasefires would continue in 
Bosnia, but with an increasing number of vows to intervene militarily by 
the international community. But nothing proposed by the international 
community would enforce these vows in any real way. Rather, the 
European Union hoped to coerce the Serbs diplomatically into a ceasefire 
(Gutman, 1993, p. xxix); this policy of appeasement would continue for 
more than three years of war. Indeed, “39 ceasefires were signed during 
the course of the Bosnian war, which Serbia used only to expand the war 
front, using each cease-fire to reposition troops and artillery for 
subsequent attacks” (Mestrovic, 1996, p. 42).  
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This incredible failure of diplomacy – 39 violated ceasefires – 
cannot be blamed on the innocence of the international community and its 
relatively new actor to foreign policy, the European Community/Union. 
Diplomats should have easily recognized the Serb policy of using peace 
negotiations as “a handy stalling device” for military gains, as it was the 
same practice the Serbs had used in the Croatian war. Moreover, the 
practice of using peace negotiation solely as a tool for military purposes 
was publicly declared by both the president of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan 
Karadzic, and the head general of the Bosnian Serb armies, Ratko Mladic. 
During the war Mladic stated: “In order to succeed, you have to be 
devious; (you have to) tell (the negotiators) one thing one time, another 
thing at another time”; Mladic believed this because, as he so eloquently 
state in 1993: “as long as planet Earth has been in existence, borders 
between states and peoples have been determined by the shedding of 
blood and by the cutting off of heads” (Cigar, 1995, p. 184)  
Karadzic was even more blunt than Mladic had been by declaring 
to Bosnian military personnel: “Pay no attention to what we do at the 
conferences, as all the maps are transient, and only what you hold is 
eternal. Hold every village of ours, and do not worry” (ibid). And yet these 
were the people, along with Milosevic, with whom the international 
community was attempting to negotiate a peace treaty.    
The international community would continue to attempt to 
approach the Serbs diplomatically on Bosnia for more than three years. 
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Thus, the international community only had diplomatic weapons with 
which to punish Serb aggression. Early on, the best the European Union 
could do was threaten to pull its ambassadors out of Belgrade, Serbia’s 
capital, excluding Serbia from diplomatic functions (Traynor and Palmer, 
1992). By the end of May 1992, the European Union had pushed through 
strongly worded sanctions at the Security Council, which in resolution 757 
banned all imports and exports, including oil to Serbia (News Services, 
1992).  
But the European Union was also going to extremes in order to 
avoid confrontation. The sanctions passed in resolution 757, for instance, 
involved no enforcement mechanisms, so while “NATO members sent a 
flotilla of small warships into the Adriatic…its navies only compiled a log 
as ships docked at the Yugoslav port(s)” (Gutman, 1993, p. xxxiv). 
Enforcement mechanisms were not added until April 27, 1993, and these 
were easily bypassed by Serb ships only months afterwards (ibid).  
Such diplomatic failures, and the inability of the European Union 
or the United States to fix them, led the Serbs to believe that no one would 
stop them militarily. They thus continued their aggressive policy, and 
ceasefires continued to be violated. The United States and the European 
Union, unable to stop the war, began to focus instead on the delivery of 
humanitarian aid for refugees in Bosnia, something they could do without 
intervening militarily on the side of a particular party in Bosnia. However, 
as the Serbs continued to attack humanitarian convoys (Helsinki Watch, 
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pp. 112-121) the international community edged closed to military combat 
with the Serbs.  
Indeed, the Security Council passed resolution 770 on August 13, 
1992, which allowed states to use force to ensure the delivery of 
humanitarian aid. The resolution’s strong language continued to center on 
the delivery of humanitarian aid, however, it also made light of the 
“abuses against civilians imprisoned in camps, prisons and detention 
centres” (United Nations, 1992). The resolution led to the deployment of 
an additional 6,000 U.N. peacekeepers to reinforce the 100 already in 
Bosnia since April (Power, 2003, p. 281). The troops included 1,800 
British troops, but no American troops (ibid). Belying the forcefulness of 
the U.N. resolution – designated as a chapter seven enforcement mission, 
which allows states and peacekeepers to use military force to carry out the 
resolution’s stated goals – troops were sent with the warning that if they 
suffered too many casualties they would be called back (Gutman, 1993, p. 
xxxvii).  
Moreover, these troops did not fulfill the resolution’s goals. Again, 
Security Council resolution 770 said U.N. troops could use force, if 
necessary, to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. The resolution, if 
properly enforced, should have brought international troops into conflict 
with Serb forces, as the Serbs hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid to 
areas that they had surrounded in order to starve out resistant Bosnian 
government enclaves such as Sarajevo, Bihac, and Srebrenica (Helsinki 
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Watch, 1992, p.121). It was clear, for instance, to everyone in the U.S. 
State Department that the siege of Sarajevo, Bosnia’s capital, was a blatant 
attempt by Serbian troops to cut off humanitarian supplies to that city and 
starve its population into surrender (Kenney, 1992). Already in August, 
Helsinki Watch had reported attacks and delays by Serbian troops on tons 
of medical, humanitarian, and emergency food supplies (pp. 112-121). 
These attacks would often encourage the threat of force by the 
international community to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
and the effectiveness of the mandate of resolution 770 (ibid, p. 192). The 
Serbian forces, however, would take this into account, and they would halt 
their “attacks for a couple of weeks, only to have actions recommence a 
few weeks later” when public pressure had declined and international 
attention was diverted elsewhere (ibid, p. 193).  
The Serbs were thus able to continue to attack and halt the delivery 
of humanitarian supplies in Bosnia, despite the strongly written resolutions 
of the U.N. Security Council and publicly available knowledge that the 
Serbs were breaking these resolutions. The deliberate policy of the United 
States, and of other governments, of not getting involved forcefully in 
Bosnia thus trumped its vocal claims to back up the delivery of 
humanitarian aid by force. Indeed, attacks by Serb forces would continue 
on humanitarian supplies into 1993 (Reuter, 1992; McKinsey, 1992; 
Talwar, 1993; Gelb, 1993) with no armed intervention by the international 
community. Legislation allowing international intervention to deliver 
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humanitarian aid would not be used, with Clinton deciding instead to 
airdrop supplies into Bosnia to avoid intervening (ibid, p. xxxviii). 
Other efforts of forceful international involvement were equally 
ineffective. The no-fly zone that the United States and NATO – with the 
graces of the United Nations – created over Bosnia by the end of 1992 
would almost never be enforced. Indeed, U.N. estimates showed that 
Serbian planes had violated the no-fly zone 4,000 times over the course of 
the conflict (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 247).  
In addition, U.N. troops in Bosnia caught Serbia funneling arms to 
the Bosnian Serbs in direct violation of the arms embargo. Indeed, U.N 
troops reported seeing the “following in transit from Serbia to Bosnia: 512 
tanks, 506 armored vehicles, 120 heavy mortars, 130 heavy artillery 
pieces, 48 rocket batteries, 33 laser-guided missiles, 368 ammunition 
trucks, 14 artillery ammunition trucks, and 1.9 million gallons of fuel” 
between October 1994 and July 1995. And this was only “the tip of the 
iceberg” according to journalists in the area (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 248). 
Despite such violations, the international community made no seizures of 
weapons or any other effort to otherwise punish the Serbs.  
This policy of deliberate nonintervention was evident, too, in the 
peace negotiation efforts by the international community. By September 
1992, the policy for Bosnia was set, with the European Union’s diplomatic 
actor Lord David Owen and U.N. envoy Cyrus Vance the main peace 
negotiators for the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. 
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Vance and Owen would only continue the pattern outlined earlier that 
stressed peace but was not enforced with any actual military engagement 
to enforce it. Peace would thus prove impossible to achieve, given Serb 
offensive war plans for a Greater Serbia (Bert, 1997, p. 243).  
As the U.S. and European governments had shown a marked 
resolve to not get involved in any forceful way in Bosnia, Owen and 
Vance were forced to attempt to reach a compromise that all three ethnic 
groups in the Bosnian conflict would agree to. As the Serbs were the most 
powerful of the three groups, the mediators had to cater to their interests, 
which was the creation of a Greater Serbia. The two negotiators thus set 
about a negotiating process of ethnic partition of Bosnia that heavily 
favored the Serbs, giving them control of 60 percent of Bosnia’s territory. 
This despite the fact that the Serbs only constituted 31 percent of the 
country’s population (Cigar, 1995, p. 119).  
While some may see Vance and Owen’s diplomatic efforts as 
pragmatic, they seem contrary to the goals of the “New World Order”. 
Indeed, the peace process allowed Bosnian Serb General Mladic and 
Bosnian Serb President Karadzic – individuals declared possible war 
criminals by the United States and who would be indicted by a war crimes 
tribunal for orchestrating genocide – to negotiate, and awarded them with 
territorial concessions.  
In the end, after almost a year of negotiation, the Vance-Owen 
peace deal failed, another example of the Serbs using the international 
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community as a stalling tactic for its war in Bosnia (ibid, p. 125; Gutman, 
1993, p. xxxiv). Other attempts at peace negotiations that came later 
followed similar lines and ended with similar results: failure and 
manipulation by the Serbs for their own gain (Cigar, 1995, p. 157). While 
all this took place over the course of three years of war in Bosnia, the 
international community did nothing except deliver aid. A notable 
exception to this is the declaration of Bosnian safe zones, and the 
intervention that ensued when the Serbs invaded these zones. This 
exception will be discussed further on in the paper.  
Aside from this exception, however, Bosnia proved that the New 
World Order was not comprehensive in its coverage. The inability of the 
U.S. and other governments to forcefully punish the Serbs for violating 
not only Security Council resolutions, but also the Genocide Convention 
and, thus, the ideals of the New World Order, demonstrated how 
international leaders could apply the enforcement of the ideals of the New 
World Order selectively. As will be demonstrated in the next section, 
because Bosnia did not fall within the direct interests of the U.S. and other 
governments – as had Iraq had during the Gulf War – government leaders 
deliberately decided not to make Bosnia an example of where the New 
World Order needed to stand strong, despite the clear violation of the New 
World Order’s ideals in the war-torn country.   
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American government and public’s reasons for not intervening  
Why did the United States avoid intervening in Bosnia in spite of 
the preponderance of evidence and recognition that genocide was taking 
place by Serb forces against the non-Serb population in Bosnia? The main 
reason was that Bosnia was not important enough politically to the 
politicians of the U.S. and other governments to merit any form of forceful 
intervention.  
Indeed, Bosnia, and the rest of Yugoslavia, had declined 
considerably in geopolitical importance following the fall of the Soviet 
Union (see above, pp. 10-11). Stability in the Balkans was no longer of 
essential importance now that there was no danger of it turning to Moscow 
for assistance. The declining nature of Yugoslavia’s strategic importance 
to the West, therefore, split foreign policy specialists in Washington 
during the Bosnian war. Some believed the United States should not 
intervene due to the limited strategic importance of Bosnia. Others 
believed the end of the Cold War would usher in the era of Bush’s New 
World Order where the United States and other countries in the world 
would intervene whenever “vital interests or cherished values were 
imperiled” (emphasis hers) (Power, 2003, p. 260).  
The side of nonintervention won the day, for the most part, in U.S. 
policy on Bosnia. It did so because Bosnia failed to register as a security 
interest to the United States. Indeed, following the Vietnam War and the 
subsequent restructuring of U.S. foreign policy, there emerged a strict set 
of requirements for U.S. intervention abroad based largely on the 
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philosophy of realpolitik, or solely strategic interests (threats to oil supply, 
regional stabilization, overriding economic interests, etc) (Power, 2003, 
pp. 260-262). This policy was seized upon by the Reagan administration 
and continued by its predecessor George H. W. Bush. While the Bush 
administration had used New World Order rhetoric in its justification of 
the Gulf War – relying heavily on the importance of international norms, 
such as state sovereignty and human rights – in Bosnia, where there were 
wonton violations of these norms by Serbia, yet U.S. actions were limited. 
Apparently the violation of these norms, recognized and condemned 
repeatedly by American political leaders over the three years of war in 
Bosnia (see above, pp. 10-11), was not enough to merit U.S. intervention 
(Power, 2003, p. 327; Mestrovic, 1997; Rieff, 1995). While arguments for 
the importance of enforcing the norms of international law would 
occasionally percolate both Bush’s and Clinton’s administrations, official 
policy would never deviate from one of non-intervention until late 1995. 
This policy of nonintervention happened because, by 1989, the U.S. 
government’s Bosnian policy was solely a humanitarian one (Sobel and 
Shiraev, 2003, p. 177). With no large reserves of oil, or other compelling 
security interest remaining in the former Yugoslavian republic, these 
humanitarian interests were not enough to lead the Bush administration to 
believe “that the Balkans held any strategic importance for the United 
States” (Gutman, 1993, p. 176).  
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Intervention, thus, was not the priority of the U.S. government. 
Indeed, there is little evidence the United States, or any nation for that 
matter, “vigorously petitioned the international community to assemble an 
intervention force”, as had occurred previously during the Gulf War. 
Instead, most states “were much more exercised by the need to refrain the 
United Nations from any further involvement” (Cushman and Mestrovic, 
1996, p. 130). The U.S. government was regimented in its decision, with 
midlevel and junior U.S. officials arguing for increased U.S. efforts in 
Bosnia, but describing the offices above them as “black holes” within 
which the reports of atrocities and their rationales for forceful intervention 
simply disappeared (Power, 2003, p. 269).  
This determination, that Bosnia did not qualify as a security 
interest to the United States, was ultimately a major deciding factor in the 
U.S.’s deliberate policy of nonintervention during the Bosnian war. 
Indeed, prior to the Gulf War, the American public showed similar levels 
of support for military intervention as it did in Bosnia (see below), with 
only 63 percent of Americans supporting Bush’s decision to go to war 
(Morin, 1990). Troop deployments to the Gulf, meanwhile, prior to Bush’s 
public rationalization for war, were met with low levels of American 
public support, with numbers hovering around 38 percent (Hey, 1990).  
Still, the fact that there was no overwhelming domestic political 
pressure supporting intervention was a major factor in the U.S. 
government not reversing its policy of nonintervention. Strong domestic 
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pressure to intervene might have galvanized change in the administrations’ 
policies. This did not come to pass, however, as the end of the Cold War 
had led to a decline in the importance of all things foreign to the American 
public. Indeed, “the extensive focus paid to the destruction of the U.S.S.R. 
by both the Reagan and Bush administration led to a desire by most 
Americans to focus on domestic issues following Communism’s collapse” 
(Bert, 1997, p. 83). Moreover, “Americans have historically opposed 
military campaigns abroad except in cases where the United States or its 
citizens have been attacked…when it has benefited from the ‘rally-around-
the-flag’ effect (Power, 2003, p. 305).  
However, media reports of the carnage would help change public 
opinion, albeit briefly. For instance, following the reports of Serb-run 
concentration camps in Bosnia by Roy Gutman of Newsday, a majority, 53 
percent of Americans, supported U.S.-backed air strikes against the Serbs, 
a rise from 35 percent in a poll administered only three weeks prior, when 
the presence of such camps was not known publicly (Watson, 1992). 
Meanwhile, only 33 percent opposed the strikes, down from 45 percent in 
the comparison of the same polls. Indeed, George Kenney, the State 
Department officer who resigned in August 1992 due to his objection to 
the U.S. policy on Bosnia, said the State Department was “nudged by 
journalists” and that their “policy was media-driven,” as the State 
Department would only respond to media reports, not actively seeking – 
and often ignoring – its own information (1992). However, coverage of 
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the war’s atrocities was not always constant and overwhelming, and there 
was a lot of confusing information about what was actually happening in 
Bosnia (Sadkovic, 1998). Plus, the attention of Americans was truly 
focused on domestic issues as, by January 1993, only one percent of 
Americans believed that Bosnia was the most important issue in American 
politics (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003, p. 146). 
All these factors considered, support by the American public for 
U.S. intervention would remain fairly constant throughout the war, with a 
slight majority of Americans supporting a U.S. troop presence in 
multilateral humanitarian and peacekeeping activities. For instance, in 
January 1993, 58 percent of Americans believed military forces should be 
used to protect humanitarian relief and prevent atrocities (ibid, p. 182). In 
August 1993, and continuing to April 1994, 61 percent of Americans 
would approve of air strikes against the Serbs. This majority of support 
disappeared if the United States would act unilaterally (ibid, pp. 180-193).  
Domestic support of U.S. military operations in Bosnia would ebb 
and flow during the course of the war. For instance, support for a U.S. 
troop presence with U.N. peacekeepers was very high, at 80 percent in 
July 1992, when the conflict was at a pitch. Support peaked at times of 
particularly intense media coverage of atrocities, as in February 1994, 
when a Serbian artillery shell exploded in a marketplace in Sarajevo, 
killing 68 people and injuring more than 200. The attack was broadcast 
extensively in the United States, something peculiar to the reporters 
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stationed in Bosnia, as reports of civilian deaths in Sarajevo due to Serbian 
shelling were frequent (Rieff, 1995, p. 18). The extensive coverage, 
however, galvanized public support for U.S. intervention, with 75 percent 
favoring U.S. involvement with U.N. peacekeepers at that time. This surge 
in support would push Clinton to urge NATO to enforce the no-fly zone 
over Bosnian airspace, and in May 1994, NATO jets shot down four Serb 
planes (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003, pp. 188, 189). However, media coverage 
of Bosnia soon died down as the Serbs – following their well-established 
policies – halted attacks on Sarajevo until international pressure subsided 
(ibid). Soon thereafter, NATO enforcement of the no-fly zone would 
return to its non-existent nature (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 236).  
The somewhat tepid support for multilateral U.S. actions, and lack 
of support for unilateral U.S. action, led George Bush to conclude that 
domestic support for U.S. intervention in Bosnia was based entirely on 
humanitarian reasons, which could evaporate the moment things went bad. 
Following the regulations for American intervention outlined under the 
Reagan administration, Bush determined that, with no strategic U.S. 
interest threatened, no American intervention should occur. Thus, despite 
consistent majority support by the American population for a U.S. 
presence in multilateral military efforts, no American troops appeared in 
any of the U.N. forces deployed in 1992 and early 1993, when Bush’s 
term as president expired (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003, pp. 194-211).  
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Clinton, meanwhile, although stressing domestic issues during his 
campaign, used Bush’s weak stance in Bosnia against him to gain political 
advantages during his election campaign in 1992 (ibid, p. 228). However, 
Clinton, once in office, would commit no U.S. troops to U.N. efforts in 
Bosnia, and repeatedly proclaimed Bosnia a European affair to be dealt 
with by Europeans (Power, 2003, p. 259). With only other countries’ 
troops on the ground, Clinton was in a precarious position to escalate 
multilateral efforts in Bosnia (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003, pp. 186, 210). But, 
despite the inertia on nonintervention it inherited in Bosnia, the Clinton 
administration did have several opportunities to reevaluate the U.S.’s 
policy in Bosnia, and it could have deployed American troops to Bosnia 
on numerous occasions. It chose not to. The Clinton administration had 
reached a similar conclusion as Bush had previously, and it chose to 
embrace Bush’s position of non-intervention for two-and-a-half years. 
According to Clinton, “the conventional political wisdom” was that there 
was “no upside and tons of downside” when considering whether to 
intervene (ibid, p. 218). Thus, due to its lack of strategic importance and 
inability to garner consistently strong numbers of public support, Bosnia 
was never able to justify itself as a case for U.S. military intervention.  
However, the public’s lack of strong, sustained support for 
intervention could also be justified by the government’s desire to not 
intervene. Unlike during the Gulf War, where the U.S. government took 
charge in advocating for military intervention, not only to the United 
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Nations but also to the American people, the Bosnian war was met with 
the opposite: a deliberate policy of misinforming the American people 
with misleading rationales for not intervening. This fact is bluntly 
demonstrated in the next section of this paper as well as in the following: 
“A…poll (administered during the war) showed that while 54 percent of 
Americans favored military intervention in Bosnia, but that figure rose to 
80 percent when those surveyed were told that an independent 
commission had found genocide under way” in Bosnia (ibid, p. 289). The 
fact that the U.S. government had privately concluded that a genocide was 
occurring in Bosnia, and that reports by independent commissions were, in 
fact, reaching such conclusions, means that one of the main reasons why 
there was not strong public support for intervention was the U.S. 
government’s failure to inform the public clearly of the nature of the 
conflict. Had the U.S. government proclaimed that it was intervening in 
Bosnia to prevent genocide, a claim that could have easily been made in 
1992 and 1993, it would have enjoyed levels of public support far larger 
than it had prior to the Gulf War (Morin, 1990).  
Indeed, “in the absence of American leadership, the public is 
usually ambivalent” about military engagements abroad; and “instead of 
leading the American people to support humanitarian intervention” in 
Bosnia, both Bush and Clinton had “adopted a policy of nonconfrontation” 
(Power, 2003, p. 305). “The administration(s) would not confront the 
Serbs, and just as fundamentally, they would not confront opponents of 
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intervention….Thus, the administration(’s) language shifted from that of 
“moral imperative to that of an amoral mess” (ibid). The New World 
Order was thus not operating effectively. 
 
 
Government rationales for not intervening  
Of course, the U.S. government could not just say it wouldn’t 
intervene in Bosnia because it served no strategic interest. To do so would 
violate the international norms embodied in the Genocide Convention and 
contradict U.S. moral and political policy. The U.S. government thus had 
to remake the Bosnian conflict into a situation that justified its non-
intervention, especially as the reports of genocide perpetrated by the Serbs 
continued to stream in starting in May of 1992 and continuing into 1995. 
The arguments and actions taken by the U.S. government as well as other 
Western nations and international institutions to justify non-intervention 
included: withholding or downplaying information about atrocities and 
genocide; the idea that the conflict was a civil war, with atrocities 
committed by all sides, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian 
Serbs; the idea that the conflict was the result of eons of ethnic strife 
between the three ethnic groups who could, thus, simply not live with one 
another; the idea that any form of Western intervention would be 
ineffective and would lead to a prolonged conflict that could easily turn 
into a quagmire for outside forces; and the idea that any escalation of 
Western intervention would jeopardize humanitarian and peacekeeping 
efforts.   
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Rationale #1: downplaying the conflict 
As the conflict in Bosnia commenced, the United States attempted 
to limit the public’s knowledge of Serbian atrocities against the non-Serb 
population. While officials high up in the administration knew of Serbia’s 
overall war plans – of removing the non-Serb population from large 
portions of Bosnian territory – early on in the conflict, they made little to 
no effort to determine the details of these removal efforts and whether they 
involved genocidal actions (Power, 2003, p. 264; Mestrovic, 1997, p. 66; 
Kenney, 1992).  
This policy of hear no evil, see no evil, got so bad that in August, 
as reports of possibly genocidal atrocities by Serb forces were reported in 
the media, the State Department “no longer believed the reports of 
starvation coming from our own embassy in Belgrade” (Emphasis mine) 
(Kenney, 1992). Indeed, despite the Bush administration’s knowledge of 
the existence of Serb-run concentration camps for non-Serb civilians in 
Bosnia, the administration continued to deny existence of the camps, even 
after their public revelation in the media in early August. Despite the 
publication of these stories, the administration still waited “until after the 
first television pictures of emaciated prisoners shocked the world” before 
addressing the issue publicly (Gutman, 1993, p. xxxi).  
Following the deluge of media reports of Serb-led genocide that 
followed the public revelation of the Serb-run concentration camps, the 
U.S. government continued to hinder the efforts of official recognition of 
the Bosnian genocide, withholding information of Serbian atrocities from 
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the United Nations (Kenney, 1992). Throughout 1993, Clinton’s secretary 
of State would continue to use the phrase that acts “tantamount to 
genocide” were taking place in Bosnia, thus allowing for condemnation of 
the actions while at the same time not raising the descriptions of the 
actions to the level of genocide, where members of the international 
community would be legally obligated to intervene. This despite the fact 
that privately, the administration recognized that genocide, not acts 
tantamount to it, was being performed by Serb forces (Power, 2003, p. 
319).  
 
Rationale #2: moral equivalency 
Thus the U.S. government attempted to avoid recognizing 
atrocities taking place in Bosnia in order to prevent further escalation of 
international involvement in Bosnia. However, this was a hard claim to 
stand on because, as early as April of 1992, reports of the worst atrocities 
and casualty rates seen in Europe since World War II were being thrust 
onto the front pages of newspapers and magazines, while leading T.V. and 
radio broadcasts. This would force some sort of response by the U.S. 
government as to its stance on this violence and what it was prepared to 
do, if anything, to stop it (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003, p. 195; Gutman, p. 
xvii). Following the U.S. government’s inability to hide the atrocities 
taking place in Bosnia, it tried to justify them as the result of a civil war 
that featured atrocities being committed by all sides.  
 73 
 And to some extent, this was true. Reports issued by non-
governmental organizations, states and the United Nations, all declared 
that both Bosnian Croat and Muslim forces, as well as Bosnian Serbs, 
were responsible for specific, documented cases of war crimes and 
atrocities (Helsinki Watch, 1992; Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 15; 
Gutman, 1993, p. 146; Mestrovic, 1996, p. 7). Politicians would use these 
reports of Muslim and Croat atrocities to claim that all sides were equally 
guilty and that there was, thus, no side on whose behalf to intervene 
(Power, 2003, p. 308). Canadian Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, who 
was chief of staff of the U.N. mission in Bosnia from March to August of 
1992, was one of the major proponents of this point of view, even going 
on a speaking tour where he declared: “Dealing with Bosnia is a little bit 
like dealing with three serial killers—one has killed 15, one has killed 10, 
one has killed five” (Gutman, 1993, p. 169). Warren Christopher, 
Clinton’s secretary of state, would make similar claims, as well as Lord 
David Owen, one of two chief peace negotiators in Bosnia for the 
international community (Cigar, 1995, p. 121). Cases of Muslim and Croat 
abuse were also detailed in major media outlets, including The New York 
Times, the New Yorker, the New Republic, Newsweek, among others, and 
was used to justify moral equivalency among all parties in Bosnia 
(Sadkovich, 1998, p. 126). Indeed, “much of the mainstream media have 
been quick to use any act of violence on the part of Croats or Muslims as a 
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pretext for morally equating all sides” (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 
17). 
However, claims of moral equivalency between Serb atrocities and 
those committed by the Muslims and Croats were simply not true. Indeed, 
cases of atrocities committed by Muslims and Croats never amounted to 
more than a combined five, 10, or – at highest estimates – 20 percent of 
the total reported atrocities and war crimes combined. Serbian forces were 
thus constantly held responsible for 80 percent, if not more, of the 
atrocities in Bosnia. Moreover, the reports showed that only the Serbs’ 
atrocities were deliberate, organized, and targeted at a specific group of 
people, in this case the non-Serbs living in Bosnia. While official reports 
such as these, which implicated the Serbs as the main perpetrators of 
atrocities in Bosnia, continued to stream in, U.S. leaders continued to 
claim moral equivalence among all ethnic groups. And these views 
continued to be dispersed by the U.S. government even after the leak of a 
confidential CIA report in March 1995, which concluded that 90 percent 
of the war crimes were committed by the Serbs, and that only Serb actions 
were systematic and organized in nature (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, 
p. 10). As The New York Times reported in its article about the leak: “the 
(CIA) report makes nonsense of the view -- now consistently put forward 
by western European governments and intermittently by the Clinton 
Administration -- that the Bosnian conflict is a civil war for which guilt 
should be divided between Serbs, Croats and Muslims” (Cohen, 1995).  
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 While the sheer disproportion of atrocities committed was a good 
counter-argument to claims of moral equivalence among the ethnic groups 
in Bosnia, the most important aspect of these reports was the organized 
nature of the atrocities committed by the Serbs. The organized nature of 
atrocities is essential in determining whether or not the Genocide 
Convention applies to cases of atrocities of war, as the destruction of an 
ethnic groups must be done “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group” in order to be defined as 
genocide (Blaustein et al, 1987, p. 100). Indeed, during World War II  
 
American, British, and Canadian servicemen all committed atrocities. 
However, the understanding up to now has been that, unlike the Nazis, 
it was not Western government policy to do so…Moreover, despite the 
excesses of the Allies at Dresden, Hiroshima, and elsewhere, most 
intellectuals today are not prepared to say that Nazi German and the 
Allies were morally equivalent” (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 24).  
 
Claims of moral equivalency made by officials with the U.S. and 
other governments, such as Secretary of State Christopher and lead 
international negotiator David Owen, were thus misleading at best, 
untruthful at worst. However baseless the claims, their dispersion by major 
political figures and members of the media contributed to the confusion 
surrounding who was at fault for the atrocities being committed in Bosnia, 
aiding the U.S. government’s policy of nonintervention (Mestrovic, 1997, 
p. 146).   
 
Rationale #3: eons of ethnic strife 
 As reports of atrocities in Bosnia continued to indict the Serbs as 
perpetrators of genocide, other excuses had to be used to justify the U.S.’s 
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policy of non-intervention. One such excuse was that the violence seen in 
Bosnia was the result of ancient ethnic hatred between the Serbs, Muslims 
and Croats of Bosnia. Intervening militarily would thus be pointless, as no 
military force, no matter how large would be able to permanently stop 
these races from armed conflict (Watson, 1992).  
And indeed, the ethnic groups in Bosnia had a history of violence 
as the Croatian Ustasa government had exterminated thousands of Serbs 
and Muslims during World War II, while Serbian forces, too, had executed 
thousands of Croatians and Muslims (Cigar, 1995, p. 107). Serbian 
propaganda, flaming the idea that Serbs were still upset by their defeat and 
subsequent rule in 1389 by the Ottoman Empire (Muslims), helped further 
cement the ideas that there existed in Bosnia historic ethnic hatreds that 
would be impossible to overcome. Even the region that Yugoslavia sits in, 
the Balkans, actually serves as the root of a verb, to balkanize, which 
means to split up “into smaller and often hostile units” (Merriam-
Webster’s, 1999, p. 87).  
Some U.S. policy elites thus thought that rather than engage in an 
politically and monetarily costly military intervention, the best route 
would be to let these the conflict continue and then pick up the pieces once 
the fighting had stopped (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 127). Others, like President 
George Bush, his Secretary of States Lawrence Eagleburger and James 
Baker, and President Bill Clinton and his Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, did not swear off Bosnia in such a manner. They did, 
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however, publicly state that military intervention would not be able to stop 
the pitched ethnic hatreds that had formed in Bosnia due to centuries of 
misdeeds (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003, p. 200; Power, 2003, pp. 302, 308). 
David Owen, co-chief piece negotiator for the international community, 
repeatedly made similar statements (Cigar, 1995, p. 11; Helsinki Watch, 
1992, p. 16).  
Yet, these statements overlooked obvious facts. First, Muslims, 
Croats, and Serbs had lived for nearly 50 years united in the country of 
Yugoslavia. Indeed, “empirical research in ethnic relations in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina carried out in 1986 and 1989 reveals that ethnic 
distance and prejudice in these lands were considerably less than in many 
other multiethnic European nations” (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 147). Second, 
alliances between all races, Muslim, Croats, and Serbs had risen and fallen 
over the many centuries these ethnicities had lived in existence with one 
another. The idea that there were simmering hatreds persistent for 
centuries thus seems a bit specious (Cigar, 1995, p. 13).  Third, peace 
between the ethnic groups was ruptured only in the late 1980s, as the 
propaganda of Serbia described above artificially inflamed ethnic hatreds 
among Serbs to the point where a genocide could take place (ibid). Prior to 
this, the three ethnicities had lived peacefully in Bosnia for nearly 50 
years. It thus seems more likely that relegating the events in Bosnia  
 
to insoluble centuries-old atavistic dilemmas shrouded in the dawn of 
time implicitly assumes that a solution will always be elusive and that it 
is pointless to seek one. Although superficially attractive, this idea was 
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often only a convenient rationalization for shrugging one’s shoulders 
and doing nothing (ibid, p. 13).  
 
 
This line of reasoning corresponds well with the U.S. and other 
governments’ repeated desire of non-intervention in Bosnia. Even so, the 
Genocide Convention does not allow for caveats. If a race, in whole, or in 
part, is being systematically targeted for destruction – as non-
governmental organizations, states, and the United Nations had repeatedly 
concluded was taking place over the three years of Bosnian war – states 
must do everything they can to stop it. Offering up the rationale of 
historical ethnic hatred as a reason to not intervene, thus, is flawed.  
  
Rationale #4: a quagmire 
This idea of irresolvable ethnic hatred, led to another reason 
offered by the U.S. government to not intervene: that any intervention 
would be ineffective, as any force would quickly find itself mired in a 
quagmire among people who could not stop fighting.  
Indeed, the Serbs were consistently portrayed as rugged, “valiant 
guerilla fighters”, based largely on the performance of Serb fighters of 
WWII, who had run a successful insurgency against Nazi troops for four 
years (Rieff, 1995). This not only led to the belief that fighting the Serbs 
would be difficult, but that it would also be immoral, as the Serbs had 
fought on the Allies side in WWII, while the Croatians and others had 
collaborated with the Nazis (Rieff, 1995, p. 39; Mestrovic, 1997, pp. 79, 
118; Gutman, 1993, p. xxi). Other factors, such as Bosnia’s rugged 
mountain topography, led those in the military, government, and media to 
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believe that any military intervention by the west would be a prolonged, 
costly, and potently disastrous, Vietnam-like engagement.  
And this may all be true, except for the part about the valiant Serb 
guerrilla fighter, as the actions of Serb fighters in World War II had 
absolutely nothing to do with the fighters in the Bosnian conflict, who 
were mostly drunken thugs (Mestrovic, 1996, p. 33); many Serbs, too, had 
in fact collaborated with the Nazis (Gutman, 1993, p. xxi). But the beliefs 
that a western intervention with ground troops would devolve into a 
quagmire may have been merited, despite the difference in the Serb 
fighters of the early 1990s from those of the early 1940s.  
However, evidence shows that a ground intervention would not 
have been needed to repel the Serbs. In fact, Alija Izetbegovic, the 
Bosnian president, said he would have been satisfied if the West were to 
simply rescind the arms embargo and allow the Bosnians to defend 
themselves (Watson, 1992). But an infusion of arms to the Bosnian side 
may not have immediately turned the tide and stopped the killing. To do 
this, the U.S. and other governments could have easily ordered air strikes 
against Serb forces, thus not getting involved in a quagmire as no outside 
troops would be deployed while still possibly fulfilling its obligations 
under the Genocide Convention of preventing a genocide taking place.  
However, even the prospects of air strikes were deemed too risky 
by the U.S. government. Members of the Bush administration argued that 
air strikes may not work in repelling Serb forces, and would thus either 
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lead to a forced escalation of the conflict to achieve their removal, or an 
embarrassment to U.S. credibility by starting an intervention and then 
having to back down, unsuccessfully (Bert, 1997, p. 242).  
However, there is little doubt that tactical “bombing of supply 
deports, artillery, key bridges…and other strategic assets in Bosnian-Serb 
areas (and) Serbia” early in the war as the Serbs were grabbing the 
majority of their territory in Bosnia “would have had a big impact on the 
war” (ibid, 24). Even after the Serbs had seized all the territory and 
cemented their positions in the Bosnian countryside, the mere threat of 
Western intervention, even in the limited form of air strikes, would have 
no doubt hindered the Serb policy of ethnic cleansing and continued 
warfare. Indeed, “the Serbs have repeatedly backed down when faced with 
even the remote possibility of Western intervention” (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 
236). There are many examples of this. One such example occurred in 
1993, when the Clinton administration advocated for the approval of air 
strikes and the lifting of the arms embargo, compelling Bosnian Serb 
leaders to immediately agree to a major peace treaty that would have 
stopped the war. After European countries refused to adopt Clinton’s 
policy due to their fears of escalation and casualties in regards to their 
troops on the ground, the Serbs reversed their position, resuming their 
attacks (ibid). Similarly, following the Serb bombing of a Sarajevo 
marketplace in February 1994, the West issued an ultimatum to the Serbs 
to pull back their artillery surrounding Sarajevo or risk air strikes. The 
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Serbs pulled back their artillery immediately, only to return them a few 
months later after international scrutiny had passed (Sobel and Shiraev, 
2003, p. 215). Likewise, after a July 21, 1994, press conference, in which 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated repeatedly that the U.S. 
would not intervene to protect an attack on Sarajevo, “the next day the 
Serbs unleashed the most intense artillery attack of their sixteen-month 
siege on the capital” (ibid, p. 233).  
Air strikes, thus, could have played a large role in stopping the 
genocide in Bosnia, as the Serbs appeared to be listening to the threats 
from the U.S. government and other Western leaders. Indeed, following 
the intense international scrutiny after publication of Serb-run 
concentration camps, rape camps, and mass executions,  
 
Serb leaders…responded by toning down their tactics. At the very least, 
they seemed to become more sophisticated and shifted their focus of 
effort to less dramatic, but probably no less effective, ways to cleanse 
territory, such as by siege and starvation, having benefited already from 
the shock value of the initial massive onslaught” (Cigar, 1995, p. 144).  
 
Moreover, some claim that if Western threats of air strikes had 
been realized, “Serbia’s war effort would have been seriously stunted, its 
war lobby seriously damaged” (Bert, 1997, p. 241). It would have 
damaged Serbs’ self-perception of invisibility, showing that mandates 
would be enforced while damaging a war machine especially susceptible 
to air strikes due to its heavy reliance on artillery, which could be easily 
targeted by air planes (Rieff, 1995, pp. 156, 157). Moreover, it would have 
declaratively stated where Western alliances lay, pushing Croatian forces 
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from their ambivalent position to the side of the Bosnians (ibid). And it 
would have, most likely, forced the Serbs to seriously negotiate, 
consolidating their gains and leading to a “shorter war and more just 
termination, with fewer victims” (Cigar, 1995, p. 174). While there were 
some advocates in the U.S. government for the use of air strikes in Bosnia, 
the option was often never explored as a serious policy option. Indeed, 
President Bush’s lamented in 1995 that, “the Pentagon never told me that 
artillery or bombing could do the job; they said it would take 250,000 men 
on the ground. Sometimes the number soared to 500,000” (Mestrovic, 
1997, p. 117).  
Instead,  
 
as the war went on, the Bosnian Serbs formed an increasingly more 
complete view of US will and intentions, and it took stronger threats to 
get their attention as they constantly validated their assumption that the 
US was not willing to intervene…The tendency for the US to talk 
tough but do nothing encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to believe they 
could make further gains, and paradoxically it encouraged the Bosnians 
to hope help was on the way” (Bert, 1997, pp. 241, 243). 
 
 By refusing to intervene, the international community thus 
emboldened Serbs’ actions in Bosnia, which would eventually lead to a 
more prolonged intervention that would cost the international community 
billions of dollars in relief and mediation effort both during and after the 
conflict (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 246). The fact that the U.S.’s dominant 
military was the key to any intervention makes it the most responsible in 
not intervening to stop the Bosnian genocide (Cigar, 1995, p. 163).  
 
 
Rationale #5: obstruction of peace and humanitarian aid 
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 Aside from claims of ineffectiveness, the West also tried to justify 
not intervening forcefully with missile strikes because such an escalatory 
policy would sacrifice the humanitarian and peace negotiation efforts 
taking place in Bosnia.  
Indeed, while the international community had experienced 
difficulty in delivering humanitarian aid, its effort to deliver the aid 
featured the longest-running humanitarian airlift since the Berlin airlift 
and was “one of the largest and most heroic humanitarian relief efforts in 
modern history” (Power, 2003, p. 326; Rieff, 1995, p. 13). However, the 
opposite had taken place with international efforts to negotiate peace, as 
Serb aggression and cleansing policies were met with condemnation and 
threats of intervention, but never actual intervention. Instead, in the end, 
the Serbs were granted territorial concessions for their condemned actions 
(Cigar, 1995, p. 125).  
 The juxtaposition of incredibly noble efforts to deliver 
humanitarian aid with extremely ignoble peace negotiations showed the 
true nature of the international community. The purpose of international 
effort  
 
was not to save Bosnia but, as politicians like to say, ‘to contain the 
crisis’…the fact that something was being done seemed to serve as a 
pretext behind which the great powers – aka the international 
community – could hide. Each time the call for intervention mounted in 
France, or Britain, or the United States, the government ministers of the 
countries in question, and, with more authority, representatives of the 
United Nations, who were perceived as having an objectivity about 
Bosnia…would quickly insist that the reason no intervention was 
possible was that it…would compromise the humanitarian effort (Rieff, 
1995, pp. 13-15).    
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 Thus, while the U.S. and other governments “often spoke sternly 
about Serb brutality and criticized European and U.N. peace plans that 
would have divided Bosnia and ‘rewarded aggression’” they did not 
intervene and “left the Bosnians to their own meager devices” (Power, 
2003, p. 327). The Serbs, meanwhile, figured the “diplomatic and 
economic jabs” of the international community “were worth enduring if 
the reward for that endurance was an independent, ethnically pure” 
Greater Serbia (ibid, p. 263). So, while two U.S. presidential 
administrations feared getting involved militarily in Bosnia due to their 
claims that such an intervention would have an ill effect on peace efforts, 
their policies of nonintervention served to exacerbate the main problem 
obstructing a peace deal, that of Serb aggression. Indeed, “by ‘hiding 
behind disaster relief,’ President Bush avoided the issue of the USA 
helping to disarm the Serbian aggressor” (Mestrovic, 1996, p. 40).  
Thus, the five rationales and actions offered by the U.S. and other 
governments to not intervene in Bosnia seem misleading, and could be 
seen simply as attempts by the U.S. and other governments not to have to 
have to intervene in a county that served they had determined served no 
strategic interest. While these rationales worked for more than three years 
in keeping the U.S. and other governments from forceful military 
intervention, as will be seen in the next section of the paper, they would 
ultimately by dragged into such an intervention. Thus, for three years, the 
U.S. and other governments spent billions in commitments of 
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humanitarian aid and military monitoring that ultimately ended up serving 
to prolong the conflict, allowing the Serbs to continue to practice genocide 
and create a Greater Serbia in Bosnia (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 246). The ideals 
of the New World Order outlined in the introduction of this paper were 
thus quashed in Bosnia.  
 
IV. Srebrenica 
 
More of the same and exceptions: safe areas and Srebrenica 
It would take substantial domestic political pressure from the 
media, Congress, and the American people to get the Clinton 
administration to change its policies in Bosnia. A major shift in policy – to 
one where the United States finally lived up to the international legal 
obligations of the Genocide Convention and the ideals of the New World 
Order – would only come due to an aberration in the international 
community’s official policy of deliberate non-intervention. This aberration 
consisted of the United Nations safe areas, enclaves of Muslim population 
in Serb-held territories of Bosnia that the international community decided 
to protect.  
Following the rapid invasion of Bosnia by Serb forces that enjoyed 
a major arms advantage, there still existed five pockets of resistant 
Bosnian towns and villages that were surrounded by Serb forces (six, if 
you count Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital). Cut off from reinforcements and 
supplies, and swollen with non-Serb refugee populations, these enclaves 
were in desperately poor condition, both militarily and from a 
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humanitarian standpoint. Already by March 1993, reports were coming 
out of once such enclave, Srebrenica, of over 30 people dying daily due to 
their inability to receive supplies (Honig and Both, 1996, p. 85). These 
reports spurred French General Philippe Morillon, then commander of 
U.N. forces in Bosnia, to go to Srebrenica personally and bring the 
world’s attention to the city with the hopes if “avoiding another Vukovar” 
(a Croatian village Serb forces completely destroyed in 1991, executing its 
inhabitants) (ibid). 
 At this point, Serb forces had been intensifying their attacks on 
Srebrenica and the other four enclaves. With the extra media attention 
brought by Morillon’s visit to Srebrenica, as well as governmental 
condemnations of Serb aggression that had occurred during 1992 and 1993 
as government and media reports continued to relay Serb atrocities and 
probable genocide, the international community finally came to the 
defense of the Bosnian people, passing U.N. Security Council resolution 
819, on April 16, 1993. The resolution declared “Srebrenica and its 
surroundings as a safe area” (United Nations, 1993, p. 2). Security Council 
resolution 824 extended this safe area status to the towns of Tuzla, in 
northeastern Bosnia, Bihac in extreme northwestern Bosnia, and Zepa and 
Gorazde, which, like Srebrenica, were also in extreme eastern Bosnia. 
Finally, on June 4, 1993, the Security Council passed resolution 836, 
which mandated U.N. troops (UNPROFOR) “to deter attacks against the 
safe areas…and to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary 
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units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (United Nations, 1993, p. 3). The resolution also authorized 
UNPROFOR “to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, 
in reply to bombardments against the safe areas…or to armed incursion 
into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those 
areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected 
humanitarian convoys” (emphasis mine) (United Nations, 1993, p. 3). The 
resolution also gave U.N. member states, acting either alone or through 
regional organizations (such as NATO), the ability to use air power to 
enforce these safe area resolutions.   
This was a major step for the international community. Prior to the 
creation of safe areas over 50 Security Council resolutions had been 
passed on Bosnia. Most of these resolutions had been passed with a focus 
on the delivery of humanitarian aid. The enforcement of human rights 
under international law – the Genocide Convention and other major pieces 
of legislation, such as the Geneva Conventions, among others – had 
become the lost agenda (Rieff, 1995, p. 164). The creation of these safe 
areas was thus a major change in policy, a shift towards enforcing the 
rhetoric of the New World Order. It also demonstrated a break in U.S. and 
international policy of strict non-involvement, aside from diplomatic 
condemnations and sanctions. This shift in policy in all likelihood saved 
the safe areas as many of them, including Srebrenica, had been under Serb 
attack when the United Nations issued the resolutions. While Serb 
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leadership assured the United States, and the other countries on the 
Security Council, that it was not their forces attacking Srebrenica and the 
other safe areas, this claim of denial was a common tactic used by the 
Serbs throughout the war, as they claimed to be dedicated to the peace 
process while in reality they were just using it to seize more land and stall 
intervention (Rieff, 1995, p 177). The United States and other 
governments could have again taken the Serbs on their word, pretending 
the enclaves were not being attacked, and allowed them to fall. Instead, 
the United States and other governments decided to stand up to Serb 
aggression, and use its power to protect a population under the threat of 
genocide. The U.S. and other governments had thus taken the leap they 
previously avoided, standing up for international law and the moral 
imperatives of the New World Order.  
The leap, however, would prove nothing more than an aberration. 
Indeed, immediately following the passage of the resolution, nations 
struggled with how the implications of the resolutions would be achieved 
(Honig and Both, 1996, p. 104). The international community had 
committed itself to the defense of five over-populated enclaves that were 
in desperate need of supplies and care. While in its resolutions the 
international community had stressed the temporary nature of the safe 
areas, as the war stretched on for another two years the burden of the safe 
areas proved to be too much for its collective will.  
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An aberration leading to a tragedy 
While the safe areas totaled five in all – six if Sarajevo is included 
– I will focus largely on Srebrenica due to its tragic end result. However, 
many of the problems described in this analysis of Srebrenica also apply to 
the other safe areas as well.  
One of the first problems Srebrenica and the other safe areas faced 
was receiving enough troops to monitor the safe areas and assure their 
safety. Military experts estimated that 34,000 troops would be needed to 
effectively monitor the safe areas. When these estimates were deemed 
excessive by nations on the Security Council, an alternate opinion stated 
that a bare minimum of 10,000 troops would be needed to ensure at least a 
“light” implementation of the resolutions (ibid, p. 116). In the end, the 
Security Council decided to grant the safe areas 7,600 troops, a sizable 
number, but well below the estimates military experts had said would be 
needed to ensure the effectiveness of the safe areas. However, even this 
reduced number also proved to be too much for nations to collectively 
assemble. It wasn’t until May 3, 1994, that 570 Dutch troops arrived in 
Srebrenica, relieving the 143 Canadian peacekeepers that had been 
deployed there in April 1993 (ibid, p. 127).   
Following the deployment of Dutch troops, the situation on the 
ground in Srebrenica gradually deteriorated. Because of the United 
Nations’ designation of Srebrenica as a safe area, instead of a safe haven, 
the Dutch soldiers were placed in a difficult situation. Whereas a safe 
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haven – which had been created in northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish 
population following the Gulf War – allowed for the international 
community to act against the wishes of all parties involved, safe areas 
required consent from all parties before any major action could be taken 
(ibid, 1996, p. 103). The Dutch forces were thus left at the mercy of the 
besieging Serb forces for the delivery of aid and supplies. This was 
especially problematic given the Serb policy of blocking the delivery of 
aid to areas that they had encircled (see page 58).  
And Srebrenica would prove no different as the Serbs slowly and 
methodically strangled the safe area. Indeed, by early July 1995, the Dutch 
were low on fuel and ammunition, and “were performing most of their 
tasks on mules and were living off emergency rations” (ibid, p. 6; Power, 
2003, p. 392). Of the 570 Dutch soldiers originally deployed, only 429 
remained in the safe area, and only half were infantry; the rest were simply 
support and medical troops (Honig and Both, 1996, p. 6). While the 
obstruction of supplies to the safe area was explicitly forbidden under 
resolution 836, the international community decided not to counter Serb 
violations with force in order to avoid derailing peace negotiations and the 
possibility of escalating Western involvement in the conflict. Moreover, 
due to the consensual nature of the safe areas, U.N. officials wanted to 
avoid confrontation as “the man you bomb today is the same man whose 
cooperation you may require tomorrow for the passage of a humanitarian 
convoy” (ibid, p. 181). Thus, requests by Dutch troops for missile strikes 
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to punish Serb attacks against the safe area were denied (Power, 2003, p. 
399). Indeed, while “the U.N. mounted a major peacekeeping operation in 
Bosnia, (it) remained hostage to…the stubborn opposition of the warring 
parties. There was no peace to keep, and no will – therefore, no mandate – 
to enforce it” (Spencer, 200, p. 155).  
This led to a situation where the presence of the Dutch troops 
maintained the safe area, but the troops had little power to enforce the 
requirements of the Security Council’s resolutions. Thus, Muslim militias 
and troops remained armed within the safe area, using it as a cover to go 
out and attack Serb forces. Serb forces, meanwhile, would retaliate with 
artillery attacks into the safe area. The Dutch troops, with no resources and 
no legitimate threat of air strikes for such “minor” infractions, could do 
“little more than watch, count, log and report violations” (Honig and Both, 
1993, p. 6). It had become clear to both the Dutch troops and Serbian 
forces outside the safe area that the peacekeepers would not be able to 
protect Srebrenica in the case of a Serbian attack. Yet again the inability of 
the United Nations and members of the Security Council to match rhetoric 
with actions had undermined efforts of enforcing international resolutions, 
law, will, and the ideals of the New World Order. This would have 
disastrous effects when Serb forces did finally attack Srebrenica in July of 
1995, overrunning it and murdering its population, continuing its policy of 
genocide but this time under direct international supervision.  
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Serbs take Srebrenica 
 By July of 1995, the United States and other governments found 
themselves in the same position they had been in since the end of 1992, 
still debating whether to use air strikes to combat Serbian aggression while 
at the same time negotiating with Serb leaders to create a peace treaty that 
they hoped would finally end the war (Bert, 1997, p. 244). Given the 
underlying belief of both negotiators and the Serbs that the only way to 
reach a durable peace treaty was through ethnic partition of Bosnia, many 
policy makers in the United States secretly wished Srebrenica would 
disappear because its presence in the Serb-held eastern territories of 
Bosnia was a major sticking point to negotiations. Indeed, “the Serb 
nationalists were not about to agree to a peace deal that preserved Muslim 
enclaves, which tied down Serb troops and kept nettlesome Muslims in 
their midst. The whole idea (of the war)…had been the creation of an 
ethnically pure Serb state (Power, 2003, p. 394). Thus, the Serbs’ attack 
on Srebrenica had been predicted by U.S. intelligence analysts prior to its 
occurrence, with the belief that the Serbs would take control strictly for 
territorial concessions during peace negotiations.  
 The Dutch troops stationed in Srebrenica, while resigned to their 
inability to fulfill U.N. resolutions, did believe that their presence, coupled 
with the power of NATO air strikes, could deter a Serb attack (ibid, p. 
392). Thus as the Serbs began their attack, the Dutch requested NATO air 
attacks, hoping to be able to enforce at least the fundamental concept of a 
safe area as defined by Security Council resolution 836. The first such 
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request came on June 6, 1995, but that request, along with four others that 
followed, was denied by U.N. leaders who were operating outside of 
Srebrenica and whose final approval was necessary for air strikes to 
commence (Power, 2003, p. 397).  
 The rationale for these denials was multifaceted. First, and 
fundamentally, the United Nations was sticking with its policy of not 
taking sides, especially due to its reliance on the Serbs for the maintenance 
of the safe areas and any effective peace treaty. The United Nations was 
thus reluctant to order any air strike unless planes caught Serb forces in 
the actual act of attacking (Honig and Both, 1996, p. 181). Moreover, 
U.N. leaders continued to believe Serbian assurances that the attacks on 
Srebrenica were not going to lead to a complete invasion. Indeed, the U.N. 
officials in charge of giving final authorization for the missile strikes 
“could not understand why (Bosnian Serb General Ratko) Mladic would 
want to take, or even punish, the safe area” while seemingly productive 
peace negotiations were taking place (ibid, p. 20).  The United Nations did 
not want to risk taking sides against the Serbs over what could have turned 
out to be another skirmish between the armed Muslims within Srebrenica 
and the Serb forces outside it (Power, 2003, p. 397). The United Nations 
thus ignored pleas of action from its own peacekeepers on the ground.  
 Once it became clear that the Serbs were meaning to invade all of 
the safe area – and after Serb forces had actually fired upon Dutch 
peacekeepers – U.N. officials finally decided to grant permission for the 
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peacekeepers’ missile requests. However, the Serbs employed simple 
tactics to avoid being struck, halting their attacks whenever NATO planes 
were overhead, and then attacking again once the planes went back to Italy 
to refuel (Honig and Both, 1996, pp. 176, 25). The careful nature of the 
NATO air strikes, which authorized planes to strike targets only when 
“actively attacking forces could be designated” meant that the Serbs had 
figured out an easy way to avoid the one remaining threat the international 
community had to halt the Serbian advance on Srebrenica (ibid, p. 22).  
Moreover, the lengthy permission request process for the air strikes 
ensured the planes were not getting updated target lists. Indeed, requests 
by troops on the ground would have to be approved first by a U.N. 
commander, then a NATO commander – a process that entailed faxing the 
requests from the field to various offices for approval. This process would 
take more than four and a half hours to achieve when Serb forces began 
their final assault on Srebrenica July 11. Due to the burdensome 
qualifications surrounding the air strikes, only one Serb tank was 
destroyed during the invasion, another damaged, by NATO. With an 
immense arms advantage due to their blockage of supplies into the safe 
area, Serb forces quickly seized control of Srebrenica and air strikes were 
called off. The Serbs were no longer attacking and the U.N. peacekeepers, 
along with 40,000 Muslims refugees the peacekeepers were mandated to 
protect, were now Serb hostages. And despite somewhat unbelievable 
claims by government officials such as “nothing in the history of the war, 
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as brutal as it was…would indicate” that the Serbs “would kill every last 
one” of the Muslims (Power, 2003, p. 410), the Serbs, unsurprisingly, 
would continue their policy of ethnic cleansing that they had so 
successfully performed during the three previous years of war.  
 
 
The Srebrenica massacre 
 After the safe area fell, the Serbs began to evacuate 25,000 Muslim 
refugees that had been protected in Srebrenica for over two years. 
Apparently 15,000 of the Muslim refugees decided to flee through the 
forests out of fear of what the Serbs would do to them. They hoped to 
reach Bosnian-held territories in the north, but most were gunned down by 
pursuing Serb forces as they passed through Serb-controlled land (Honig 
and Both, pp. 48-53). The ones who stayed behind, especially the men of 
combat age, shared an equally grisly fate. While the Dutch peacekeepers 
tried to maintain control over the evacuation process, Serb forces were in 
de facto control, with Serb General Ratko Mladic eventually ordering the 
men separated from the women and children. Thus, “while the U.N. 
soldiers looked on, armed Serbs ripped fathers, brothers, and sons from the 
hysterical grip of the women” (ibid, p. 402).  
As had been the case over the previous three years of ethnic 
cleansing by the Serbs, the Serbs justified the separation as an 
investigation into war crimes they said the Muslim men had perpetuated. 
Reports of the separation of the refugees by gender did not raise 
immediate alarm among the leaders of the U.S. and other governments. 
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For instance, officials at the United Nations claimed that “they trusted 
Serb promises to adhere to the Geneva Conventions” (ibid, p. 410). 
Demands of international observation for the refugee evacuation process 
met with claims that the Serbs had been continually making during their 
three-year-plus war campaign in Bosnia: The Serbs “never refused access 
to international observers; they granted it so as not to arouse suspicions 
but then blocked or ‘postponed’ it on the grounds that they could not 
guarantee the safety of visitors” (emphasis hers) (ibid, p. 411).  
Thus the status of the more than 6,000 male refugees from 
Srebrenica became unknown. Already, on July 12, a day after Srebrenica 
had fallen, Dutch soldiers began finding dead bodies of Muslim refugees 
in the town of Potocari, a village to the north of Srebrenica, where the 
refugees had fled and were subsequently held by the Serbs for transport. 
On July 13, more than 4,000 of the male refugees failed to reach Tuzla, a 
safe area in northeastern Bosnia, where U.N. officials had expected them 
(Honig and Both, 1996, p. 44). Instead, the men were transported by the 
Serbs from Potocari to Bratunac, to the northeast of Srebrenica near the 
border with Serbia. In Bratunac, the men were herded into a stadium and 
onto a football field, where Dutch solders posted in Bratunac heard 
continual gunfire. Serb soldiers would later brag to the Dutch soldiers 
about how they were murdering all the men. On July 14, Dutch soldiers 
witnessed nearly 1,000 of the refugee men crouched on the football field. 
“That same day, an American U-2 spy plane photographed some 600 
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people on the same field. When the plane returned some days later, the 
football field was empty, but it was noticed that a nearby field had 
changed in appearance: it showed signs of recent mass digging, and 
experts identified what they believed to be three mass graves” (ibid, p. 
59).  
In all, an estimated 6,546, unarmed men would go missing 
following the fall of Srebrenica (ibid, p. 65). The Serbs, meanwhile, took 
the women, children and elderly of Srebrenica on a “ghastly journey” that 
paralleled the forced deportation descriptions that the Serbs had practiced 
earlier in the Bosnian war (see above, pp. 32-33). On their trip to Tuzla, 
where they would eventually be deposited, the 23,000 women and children 
“were frequently stopped along the way so that Serb gunmen could select 
the young, attractive women for a roadside rape…it was public knowledge 
that women between fifteen and thirty-five were being singled out and 
removed from buses” (Power, 2003, pp. 403, 404). Instead of the 
prolonged trips and rape camps that had been the common treatment of 
refugees by the Serbs earlier in the war, most of the women, children and 
elderly refugees that made it to Tuzla after only a two-and-a-half hour 
journey; none of the men, however, would make it out of Bratunac alive.  
 
Government and public knowledge 
The main goal of the United Nations at this point was to ensure the 
safety of its captured peacekeepers, and to aid the arriving refugees who 
had been deported by the Serbs from Srebrenica to Bosnian-controlled 
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territory. Reports received by the United Nations of the missing Muslim 
men, and their possible mass murder, were thus not acted upon (Honig and 
Both, 1996, p. 44). Similarly, the United States was not using its satellite 
technology to determine whether reports of mass slaughter coming from 
the Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations were true. Instead, the 
United States was busy focusing on how to limit the vulnerability of its 
NATO pilots (Power, 2003, p. 408).  
By July13, it was public knowledge that the men of Srebrenica 
were being separated from the women and children in Potocari and 
transported elsewhere, and that thousands of the male refugees had gone 
missing. The media were reporting this as well as summary executions of 
refugees by the Serbs on July 14. The number of people reportedly 
executed, however, was small in number (ibid, p. 404). The United States’ 
only response was to declare that any Serb action against international law 
would be held accountable later by the U.N. war crimes tribunal. By July 
21, reports continued to come in from survivors of systematic executions 
of the more than 6,000 men missing from Srebrenica’s refugee population. 
Reports were of Muslims being led off transport busses two-by-two, or in 
some cases 20-by-20, to specific areas, and then executed by gunshot 
moments later. The reports “were too numerous and ‘too authentic’ to be 
false”, the Dutch defense minister publicly stated on July 21, as the last of 
the Dutch peacekeepers from Srebrenica came home (ibid, p. 417).  
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On July 24, the U.N. Human Rights Commission’s Special 
Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, issued a 
report declaring that the United Nations knew nothing of the more than 
6,000 Muslim refugees from Srebrenica who had disappeared under in 
Serb supervision. Mazowiecki publicly pleaded for U.N. action both to 
determine the whereabouts of the missing refugees as well as to come to 
the aid of the eastern safe area of Zepa, which had come under Serb attack 
but was still fighting to protect itself with the help of its 79 peacekeepers. 
The United States and other governmnet, however, on July 21 had 
publicly declared they would use air power only to protect the safe area of 
Gorazde, which was not then under attack. By July 27, Serb forces had 
overrun the safe area of Zepa, its 16,000 refugees meeting the same fate as 
those of Srebrenica, with the men who trusted themselves to Serb 
authorities murdered (ibid, p. 418). This proved too much for Mazowiecki 
who resigned from his post, disgusted with what he said was a “slow and 
ineffectual” policy of the United Nations and other governments in the 
face of a “swift and brutal” Serb policy of ethnic cleansing. “‘The very 
stability of international order and the principle of civilization of 
civilization is at stake over the question of Bosnia”, Mazowiecki said. 
‘I…cannot continue to participate in the pretense of the protection of 
human rights’” (emphasis mine) (ibid).  
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What the U.S. (and other) governments did 
But, at least in the United States, Bosnian policy was changing. 
Increased pressure from Congress, media, and, especially from republican 
Senator Bob Dole, who was emerging as Clinton’s chief competition in 
the upcoming presidential election of 1996, was making Clinton look 
weak and ineffectual. Clinton had criticized – much to his political benefit 
– George Bush’s unwillingness to actively intervene in Bosnia in 1992, as 
reports of Serb ethnic cleansing came out during the fall of the 1992 
election campaign. While in office, the claims Clinton had made during 
his election campaign of 1992, such as: “I would begin with air power 
against the Serbs to try to restore the basic conditions of humanity”, had 
subsequently clashed with his commitment to domestic issues, 
multilateralism, and his fear of limited public support for military 
intervention in Bosnia (ibid, p. 274; Sobel and Shiraev, 2003, pp. 186, 
210; see above).  
But, now, things had changed. Following the fall of Srebrenica and 
reports of mass executions that followed, 52 percent of Americans 
supported the unilateral deployment of U.S troops to Bosnia (Sobel and 
Shiraev, 2003, p. 217). This was the first time the support level for 
unilateral intervention had reached a majority. Moreover, 78 percent of 
Americans approved the deployment of U.S. troops in a multilateral 
context, also a high number based on past levels of public support (see 
above, p. 68). As Clinton continued to be skewered by the media, 
congressional leaders, the American public, and his future competition for 
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reelection, he exclaimed, privately, on July 14: ’This can’t continue….We 
have to seize control of this….I’m getting creamed” (Power, 2003, p. 
437). Bosnia had finally crossed into the direct political calculations of a 
U.S. president. And it wouldn’t be long before action took place.  
Clinton’s national security advisers began meeting almost daily by 
July 17, starting a process where they would meet 21 times in 23 days to 
talk exclusively about U.S. policy on Bosnia. Clinton himself would 
attend many of these meetings (ibid, p. 438). The United States, 
meanwhile, began to use satellite data to determine what had actually 
happened to the missing refugees of Srebrenica. By August 4, the analysis 
of the data had all but proved that the Bosnian male refugees of Srebrenica 
had been slaughtered. The analysis of satellite data showed the location 
where hundreds of Bosnian men were herded by the Serbs. Days later, 
these locations turned into large mounds of overturned dirt with heavy 
vehicle tracks surrounding the newly created mounds of earth (ibid, p. 
419). This evidence led the United States to believe that the refugees had 
been executed and buried in mass graves, a conclusion the country shared 
with the United Nations in a closed session of the Security Council on 
August 10. The evidence wasn’t released publicly, however, until later in 
November in a U.N. report (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 19).  
Diplomatically, however, things were progressing quickly. On 
August 8, Clinton’s National Security Adviser Anthony Lake embarked on 
a trip to Europe to inform American allies that there was to be a change in 
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U.S. policy: The United Sates was going to bomb the Serbs if they 
violated anymore U.N. resolutions. While the United States hoped for 
cooperation from its allies in NATO, if they did not approve of the change 
in policy, the U.S. made it clear there was little they could do to stop it 
(Power, 2003, p. 437). The allies, thus, began to pull their troops out of 
Bosnia, and by late August, U.N. peacekeepers had been completely 
withdrawn. The policy had changed: now any move of Serb aggression 
against the non-Serb area of Bosnia, even if not publicly known, would be 
met not with negotiation, but with force (ibid).  
The Serbs had disrupted the delicate balancing game they had been 
playing in Bosnia for more than three years with the U.S. and other 
governments. When, on August 28, a Serb artillery shell landed in a 
marketplace of Sarajevo, killing civilians, the game had officially ended. 
The United States, under the auspices of NATO, began a bombing 
campaign against the Serbs, finally enforcing international law and some 
semblance of the New World Order after refusing to do so for more than 
three years. Beginning on August 30, 
 
NATO planes flew 3,400 sorties and 750 attack missions against fifty-
six targets. They avoided aged and rusty Serb tanks and concentrated 
on ammunition bunkers, surface-to-air missile sites, and 
communications centers. They called the mission Operation Deliberate 
Force, as if to announce up front that what might have been called 
‘Operation Halfhearted Force’ was a thing of the past. The Bosnian 
army was sent into tailspin, and Muslim and Croat soldiers succeeded 
in retaking some 20 percent of the country that had been seized and 
cleansed in 1992 (ibid, p. 440).  
 
 As the air strikes continued at a clip not seen since the Gulf War, 
the Serbs not only stopped their offensives on the ground, but they also 
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began cooperatively negotiating for peace.  The peace process benefited 
by having President Clinton personally advocating for the success of the 
negotiations while also promising to supply U.S. troops, under the 
auspices of NATO, to ensure the peace treaty was maintained (Martin and 
Silber, 1995). The fact that the negotiations took place in Dayton, Ohio, in 
the heart of the United States, seemed to mean the United States meant 
business. On November 21, leaders from the three main ethnicities in 
Bosnia reached an agreement on a ceasefire. On December 15, 1995, the 
Dayton Peace Accords were formally signed. After three years of 
nonintervention, the U.S. government had ended the bloodiest conflict in 
Europe since World War II in a little more than three months. However, 
during the prolonged course of the war, about 102,000 people had been 
killed, tens of thousands murdered simply due to their ethnicity (Silber, 
2005). 
 
V. Aftermath 
 
The Dayton Peace Accord and more failure 
The West had not completely washed its hands and righted its 
policies in Bosnia with the passage of the peace accords. The peace treaty 
and subsequent actions by U.S. politicians and their policies in Bosnia 
would reveal more failures by the U.S. and other governments to adhere to 
the ideals of a New World Order.  
First, “ultimately, the removal of Srebrenica was a political boon to 
the Dayton Peace process, and probably wanted by western 
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negotiators…the loss of the two Muslim enclaves had tidied the map of 
Bosnia by eliminating two nettlesome noncontiguous patches of territory” 
(Honig, 1996, p. 185). The allowance of the fall of Srebrenica and the 
territorial concessions of this territory to the Serbs in the Dayton Peace 
Accords helped Serb leadership achieve a goal it had been pursuing since 
1986 (see above, p. 12), splitting the country into separate ethnic entities. 
The Serbs, who constituted only 31 percent of the population prior to the 
war’s commencement, received 49 percent of the country, including 
Srebrenica, to govern. The Croats and Bosnian Muslims received the 
remaining 51 percent of the country, which they were to govern jointly. 
The country remained united, with one government centered in Sarajevo, 
but each entity, and hence, each ethnicity, had its own regional 
government. These regional governments would prove to be stronger than 
that of the central state, allowing the Serbs to achieve their goal of an 
ethnically pure state dominated by Serbs. This further entrenched 
ideologies of nationalism in Bosnia (Silber, 2005).  
But peace had come at last to Bosnia, and it came in large part due 
to the international community. While Clinton warned that “America 
cannot and must not be the world’s policeman” Clinton tried to frame the 
peace treaty and subsequent deployment of U.S. troops to implement the 
treaty as a moral imperative. “He invoked images of raped women and 
skeletal men in concentration camps” and asked Americans never to forget 
that “a quarter of a million men, women and children have been shelled, 
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shot and tortured to death. Two million people, half of Bosnia's 
population, were forced from their homes and into a miserable life as 
refugees”. And he implored his “fellow Americans” that “in this new era, 
there are still times when America – and America alone – can and should 
make the difference” (emphasis mine) (Mitchell, 1995). Why the U.S. 
government chose to intervene following the fall of Srebrenica and the 
death of a little less than 6,000 Bosnians when, as Clinton admits, there 
had been a quarter of a million victims during the three years of Serb 
ethnic cleansing reiterated the contradiction  between the New World 
Order and the policies of the U.S. government.  
Another example of the failure of the New World Order in Bosnia 
is the continued policy of U.S. and NATO troops to pursue indicted Serb 
war criminals. U.S. and NATO troops only make arrests when they 
“happened to encounter” an indicted war criminal (Power, 2003, p. 492). 
While the Dayton Accords stressed that the Serbs must work with the U.N. 
war crimes tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice, they made 
no allowances for NATO troops to actively pursue war criminals (Jensen, 
1995). This led to the situation where many of the more than 40 Serbs 
charged with war crimes “not only lived freely but also continued to 
occupy positions of authority” (Power, 2003, p. 492). Indeed, Bosnian 
Serb General Ratko Mladic and Bosnian Serb President Radovan 
Karadzic, two of the chief leaders of Serb genocide in Bosnia, still remain 
“at large” to this day, despite the fact that they are openly seen in public 
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and can easily be found by reporters who wish to talk to them (ibid). 
Despite some minor progress with the war crimes tribunal, the failure to 
apprehend those most responsible for the genocide in Bosnia while they 
remain visible members of their communities is another demonstration of 
how the U.S. is not living up to even a limited interpretation of the New 
World Order. 
Thus, even after having intervened to halt practices of genocide, 
U.S. and other governments’ policies failure to punish Serb actions of 
genocide continue to reveal how the U.S. and other governments are 
failing to enforce the principles of the New World Order. 
 
Conclusion  
Bosnia proved to be a large failure in the hopes that a New World 
Order would emerge out of the post-Cold War world. President George H. 
W. Bush had declared the possible creation of the New World Order prior 
to the Gulf War, which he claimed provided the United States with a “rare 
opportunity” to demonstrate its ability to lead the world to a future where 
the “victory for the rule of law and for what is right” ruled foreign policies 
of the U.S. and other governments. 
The genocide that took place in Bosnia immediately after the 
success of the Gulf War would prove to be a test of the New World Order 
that the U.S. and other governments would not pass. Indeed, the large 
amounts of information that a genocide might take place in Bosnia, the 
large amounts of public and confidential information that the U.S. and 
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other governments possessed which confirmed – while the genocide was 
taking place – that a genocide had occurred in Bosnia, and the creation of 
misleading rationales the U.S. and other governments disseminated to 
justify their policies of nonintervention demonstrated the failure of the 
idea of a New World Order in U.S. foreign policy. Put more succinctly, 
the Bosnian genocide provided “sufficient evidence to discredit once and 
for all the idea that nations willingly march out to help their fellow non-
nationals, especially if there is a cost involved” (Bert, 1997, p. 237).  
Moreover, after successful intervention to halt genocide, the U.S. 
and other governments’ actions following the successful intervention 
demonstrated a further failure in the testing of the New World Order. The 
U.S. and other governments’ actions of rewarding Serb aggression and 
genocide while failing to punish the Serb leaders responsible for these 
illegal policies demonstrate this.  
While these conclusions are meant to apply solely to the study of 
U.S. and other governments’ actions in Bosnia, larger implications can be 
seen in the failure of the New World Order in Bosnia. First, the deliberate 
policy of governments to avoid intervening to prevent a genocide debunks 
claims of “never again”, the “unwritten belief that with (more) 
knowledge” of a genocide taking place “the international community will 
act” (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 157). Indeed, during other 
genocides of the 20th century, this was a common claim. In Cambodia, for 
instance, the country was cut off from the outside world due to its hostile 
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government and the strict adherence to state sovereignty during the Cold 
War. In Rwanda, the limited press and government activity in that country 
was commonly blamed for non-intervention (Melvern, 2004, p. 129; 
Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 3). “But in the Bosnian war, the truth had never been 
in short supply. What was missing was U.S. willingness to risk its own 
soldiers on the ground or to convince the Europeans to support NATO 
bombing from the air. As a result, the ethnic cleansing and genocide 
against the country’s Muslims proceeded apace” (Power, 2003, p. 327). 
This seems to substantiate claims of many scholars (Power, 2003; 
Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996; Melvern, 2004; Brunner and Mills, 2002; 
Adelman and Suhrke, 1996) that it was not a lack of knowledge, but a lack 
of will on the part of informed governments to intervene in the other cases 
of genocide during the 20th century beside Bosnia.  
Another implication of the failure in Bosnia is that it revealed 
possible limitations of the United Nations. While the organization has 
made it possible to codify many of the world’s moral codes into 
international law, the organization’s ineffectiveness to enforce these laws 
was fully demonstrated in Bosnia. Indeed, “the U.N. mandate” during the 
Bosnian war “included enforcing no-fly zones, protecting” populations in 
the seven safe areas,  
 
delivering humanitarian assistance, making Sarajevo free from heavy 
weapons, and other demands (featured) in over one hundred Security 
Council resolutions…The United Nations had the authority to enforce 
these resolutions and protect civilians: it could use ‘all necessary 
means.’ Yet these mandates were intermittently implemented at best, 
and, at worst, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and other atrocities were 
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carried out by Serbs in full view of the United Nations without much 
response” (ibid, 151). 
 
 While some of the failure of the United Nations to act forcefully in 
Bosnia can be blamed personally upon U.N. personal not taking an active 
enough role in condemning and punishing Serb aggression (see above, p. 
73), a lot of it can be explained by the very nature of the organization 
itself.  
Take, for example, the quintessential U.N. operation of 
peacekeeping. In Bosnia – despite the deployment under chapter seven 
status, which allows the peacekeepers to use force to implement its 
resolutions – the United Nations was forced to treat all parties in Bosnia in 
an impartial and neutral manner. After U.N. member-states stated they 
would not intervene forcefully in Bosnia, forceful implementation of 
resolutions became a non-option for the organization.  Thus the United 
Nations was forced to rely on an ethos of  
 
impartiality and neutrality…In this view, the United Nations’ power 
derives from persuasion rather than coercion, which, in turn, is 
dependent on its moral authority. And, the argument goes, its moral 
standing is founded on its impartiality. All parties must be treated 
equally and not be shown favoritism or partiality. UN officials, in other 
words, would have to tolerate the occasional evil if they were going to 
be able to remain effective not only in Bosnia but elsewhere” (ibid, p. 
152).  
 
Thus, until the United States and other governments embrace 
policies of more forceful intervention, the United Nations will continue to 
be handcuffed. This is especially problematic given that the United 
Nations is often used as a fig leaf to cover up inaction by states, as it was 
in Bosnia (Rieff, 1995, pp. 192, 193). With forcefully worded resolutions, 
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but a system that doesn’t allow these resolutions to be enforced, nations 
can continue to give the appearance of wanting a New World Order, 
while, in reality, pursuing a policy of inconsistent morality. 
Thus, given these implications and the overall failure of the U.S. 
and other government to prevent genocide in Bosnia, governments will 
probably always be able to find a rationale to avoid having to prevent 
genocide. What will it take to have the U.S. governments fulfill the 
obligations of the Genocide Convention? The experience in Bosnia seems 
to suggest the only way to have this occur is to force the issue directly 
onto the political agenda of the president. Indeed, policy in Bosnia 
changed only when Clinton was “getting creamed”, the political costs of 
him not intervening too much to take (see above, p. 101). How to put 
genocide – or other major human rights violations – on the political 
agenda of the president is a task for another paper. However, it is 
something of tremendous importance for, as Toby Gati, a member of the 
Clinton administration, said, “when you make the original decision that 
you aren’t going to respond (to a genocide) when these kind of things 
happen, then, I’m sorry, but these things are going to happen” (Power, 
2003, p. 420).  
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